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“MORAL MONSTERS” UNDER THE BED:
HOLDING CORPORATIONS ACCOUNTABLE FOR
VIOLATIONS OF THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE AFTER
KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO.
Mara Theophila*
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) provides foreign plaintiffs with the sole
means of obtaining jurisdiction in U.S. courts for alleged human rights
abuses. These plaintiffs increasingly seek to hold corporations accountable
for complicity in some of the most notorious violations of international law
occurring overseas. Prior to 2010, U.S. courts routinely entertained ATS
claims against corporations without question. Yet, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
recently held that the ATS does not provide foreign plaintiffs redress
against corporate entities.
The Second Circuit relied solely on
international law in making this finding.
This Note examines whether international or domestic law should control
a court’s determination of which defendants may be held liable under the
ATS. This Note analyzes the established choice of law principles for
determining what constitutes a “violation of the law of nations” and the
recent split between circuits on who can be liable for such a violation.
From this discussion, this Note advocates a new approach to choice of law
principles based on the difference between conduct and remedies under the
ATS. The U.S. Supreme Court undoubtedly requires lower courts to
consider international law in determining whether a defendant’s conduct
violates international law. Once this is established, domestic law provides
the means for holding that defendant—whether an individual or corporate
entity—accountable.
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INTRODUCTION
U.S. common law has treated corporations as “persons” since the early
republic by vesting corporate entities with many of the same rights and
responsibilities as any individual.1 The U.S. Supreme Court continues to
expand the parameters of the rights encompassed by this corporate
personhood. 2 During its 2009 Term, the Court struck down a federal law
limiting corporate political campaign contributions as too burdensome on a
corporation’s First Amendment rights. 3 This Term, the Court considered
the merits of further extending to corporations the rights of privacy, 4
As the Court becomes
mandatory arbitration,5 and due process. 6
increasingly sympathetic to corporate rights, one would expect that with
these rights would come greater corporate responsibilities.
Yet, quite the opposite has resulted within the context of the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS). 7 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, along
with two district courts, recently denied the ability of U.S. courts to ever
hold corporate “persons” liable for violations of the law of nations under
the ATS. 8 This seemingly contradictory outcome results from the courts’
novel applications of international law to determine whether a corporation
can violate the ATS.9 Prior to September 2010, courts adjudicating ATS

1. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (“A
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of
its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”).
2. See Adam Liptak, Justices To Examine Rights of Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
29, 2010, at A20; Lyle Denniston, Analysis:
The Personhood of Corporations,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2010, 6:45 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/analysis-thepersonhood-of-corporations/.
3. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
4. See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1180–81 (2011) (considering whether
corporate documents fall within an exception to the Freedom of Information Act).
5. See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted
sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010) (asking whether
courts must enforce a provision within a corporate contract that requires a consumer to waive
the right to file a class action lawsuit).
6. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 567 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2009), cert. granted sub nom. Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010)
(questioning whether the government can constitutionally invoke the state secrets doctrine to
prevent a corporate contractor from defending itself).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). In accordance with judicial practice, this Note will use the
phrases “law of nations” and “customary international law” interchangeably. See, e.g.,
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A violation of the law
of nations is broadly understood as a violation of the norms of customary international
law.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. 1, ch.
2, intro. note (1987) (“[T]he law of nations [is] later referred to as international law . . . .”).
8. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010); Flomo
v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 744 F. Supp. 2d 810, 815–16 (S.D. Ind. 2010); Viera v. Eli
Lilly & Co., No. 1:09-cv-0495, 2010 WL 3893791, at *1–3 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2010); Doe
v. Nestle, S.A., No. CV 05-5133, 2010 WL 3969615, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010).
9. Judge Pierre N. Leval issued a strongly worded concurrence in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit case, which laid out his frustration with both the reasoning of
the majority, and the injustice that would occur as a result. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 150–51
(Leval, J., concurring).
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claims uniformly applied domestic concepts of corporate liability and did so
without question in the overwhelming majority of cases. 10 In Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 11 the Second Circuit rejected application of
domestic law as “entirely irrelevant” to determining who is capable of
violating international law. 12 In denying the plaintiffs’ request for
rehearing, Judge Dennis G. Jacobs countered the fears that the decision
would give “absolution to moral monsters.” 13 He described these “moral
monsters” as humans, who may still be brought to justice following the
Kiobel decision. 14 However, as this Note demonstrates, the Second
Circuit’s interpretation of the ATS unjustifiably conflates the threshold
question of what constitutes a violation with the secondary issue of who can
be held liable under the statute.15
This Note draws from these recent and largely unexamined opinions to
provide a better understanding of which body of law governs the question
of whether corporate defendants can be liable under the ATS. To do so,
Part I of this Note describes the basic choice of law guidelines laid out by
the Supreme Court and the way in which lower courts attempt to apply
these principles. Next, Part II examines the divergent approaches taken by
courts in determining whether a corporate entity can be held liable for a
violation of the law of nations. From this discussion, Part III argues that
lower courts should adopt a new approach to identifying whether
international or domestic law governs an issue arising under the ATS. This
Note concludes that the principles laid out by the Supreme Court command
that if a corporate entity violates international standards of conduct,
domestic law supplies the means for holding that corporation accountable.
I. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE, SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN, AND CHOICE OF
LAW PRINCIPLES
Courts struggle to adjudicate ATS claims according to a consistent set of
principles. Much of this difficulty stems from the lack of a clear
understanding of the purpose behind the ATS. Part I.A of this Note
provides a brief overview of the background surrounding the enactment of
the ATS and the Supreme Court’s single attempt to clarify the principles
underpinning the statute. Part I.B describes the way that lower courts
10. See id. at 161 & n.12 (listing the courts imposing liability on corporations).
11. 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
12. Id. at 118 n.11.
13. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2011 WL
338048, at *4 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2011) (Jacobs, J., concurring).
14. Id.
15. See infra Part III.A. Following the Kiobel opinion, Professor Kenneth Anderson
framed the issue before the Second Circuit in similar terms. See Kenneth Anderson, Extra
Thoughts on Today’s 2nd Circuit ATS Decision, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 17, 2010, 10:49 PM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/17/extra-thoughts-on-todays-2nd-circuit-ats-decision/.
Specifically, Anderson described the question before the court as whether the legal qualities
of “who” violates the ATS are relevant after a court determines that “what” constitutes a
violation is satisfied by the defendant’s conduct. Id. This Note offers an independent
analysis of the question while utilizing Anderson’s language—the “who” and the “what”—to
frame the issue.
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utilize these principles to determine what constitutes a violation under the
ATS. Lastly, Part I.C summarizes the widely varied approaches to deciding
who can be liable for an ATS violation in the absence of clear guidance by
the Supreme Court.
A. The Development of ATS Jurisprudence
The First Congress of the United States passed the ATS as one sentence
of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 16 The statute provides that “[t]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.” 17 The debates surrounding the adoption of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 did not reference the ATS, and there is little evidence of the
drafters’ intent behind this sentence.18 Described as a “legal Lohengrin,”
the ATS was perceived as an “old but little used section,” which “no one
seems to know whence it came.” 19 As a result, there existed little
understanding of, or use for, the ATS following its enactment. 20
Although minimal, there were two notable exceptions to this
characterization during the years immediately following the ATS’s
enactment. 21 First, in Bolchos v. Darrel, 22 the U.S. District Court for the
District of South Carolina assumed that the ATS provided a supplemental
basis for jurisdiction over an admiralty suit for damages brought by a
French privateer against a mortgagee of a British slave ship.23
Furthermore, in 1795, Attorney General William Bradford advised the State
Department on whether American citizens who took part in the destruction
of a British slave colony could be subject to criminal liability. 24 Although
16. Ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
Congress has slightly modified the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) on a number of occasions since
its original passage. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 n.10 (2004); see JENNIFER
K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32118, THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH VIEWS 5–7 (2003) (describing these minor textual
changes).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
18. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (noting that the debates nowhere mention the provision, as far as the court was
aware); ELSEA, supra note 16, at 2, 4–5.
19. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975); see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 718–
19 (describing a lack of consensus in understanding the congressional intent behind the
ATS). For a comprehensive examination of the circumstances surrounding the enactment of
the ATS, see William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts
Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467 (1986); Kenneth C.
Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort
Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1 (1985).
20. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 718–19; Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1015.
21. See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607); Breach of
Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 58–59 (1795). For a discussion of how these incidents
inform an understanding of the scope of the ATS, see Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720–21; BETH
STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 6–7 (2d ed.
2008); Randall, supra note 19, at 48–52.
22. 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607).
23. See id. at 810–11.
24. Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. at 58–59.
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Bradford expressed doubt regarding the citizens’ criminal culpability, he
opined that a federal court would be willing to entertain the foreign
plaintiffs’ civil claims under the ATS.25 Despite this decree, the ATS lay
nearly dormant for the next 200 years.26
A 1978 complaint filed in a district court within the Second Circuit
ushered in the modern era of ATS litigation.27 In Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,28
two Paraguayan nationals brought suit against a former Paraguayan police
officer then residing in the United States.29 Invoking jurisdiction under the
ATS, the plaintiffs alleged that the former officer had kidnapped and
tortured a family member in violation of international law.30 The U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the claim for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.31 On appeal, the Second Circuit
reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that “[a]lthough the Alien Tort
Statute has rarely been the basis for jurisdiction during its long history . . .
there can be little doubt that this action is properly brought in federal
court.” 32 The plaintiffs undeniably fulfilled the plain language of the
statute—an action by an alien, for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations—and thus properly invoked jurisdiction under the ATS. 33
The ATS did not create new rights, but simply opened the federal courts to
adjudication of certain substantive rights already universally accepted by
international law. 34
Following Filártiga, plaintiffs increasingly filed suits under the ATS to
seek redress for various types of alleged violations of the law of nations.35
Despite this flurry of litigation, the Supreme Court’s 2004 opinion in Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain 36 constituted the first substantive examination of the

25. Id. at 59 (“[T]here can be no doubt that the company or individuals who have been
injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United
States; jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for a
tort only, in violation of the laws of nations . . . .”).
26. See ELSEA, supra note 16, at 13; Casto, supra note 19, at 468 (describing the
provision as having “lapsed into desuetude”). For the few reported cases in which federal
courts considered the ATS prior to 1980, see Casto, supra note 19, at 469 n.7.
27. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004) (characterizing Filártiga
v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), as “the birth of the modern line of cases”);
William R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies for Violations of
International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 638 (2006).
28. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
29. Id. at 878.
30. Id. at 878–79.
31. Id. at 879–80.
32. Id. at 887.
33. Id. at 880, 889.
34. Id. at 887.
35. See ELSEA, supra note 16, at 15; STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 21, at 12.
36. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). Prior to Sosa, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second,
Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, in addition to district courts within the U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the First and D.C. Circuits, applied the ATS principles as outlined by Filártiga.
See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 21, at 16.
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ATS in its 215-year history. 37 The case was brought by Alvarez-Machain,
a Mexican national, who alleged that he had been arbitrarily arrested and
detained in Mexico by Mexican authorities and by an agent of the United
States. 38 Alvarez-Machain claimed that these actions violated the law of
nations and he filed suit, under the ATS, in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California. 39 The district court awarded summary
judgment and $25,000 in damages to the plaintiff on the ATS claim. 40 A
three-judge panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the ATS judgment. 41 En banc, a divided court upheld the
decision. 42
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, in part, on the question of whether
Alvarez-Machain’s abduction and detention was a violation of customary
international law that would support an action under the ATS. 43 Prior to
Sosa, a number of courts had agreed with the Second Circuit’s
interpretation of the ATS as creating a federal tort for violations of the law
of nations. 44 Backed by the United States in a supporting brief, 45 Sosa
argued that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief under the ATS because the
statute was not intended to grant a right of action without further
congressional approval. 46 The parties argued that the ATS solely vested the
federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction.47
In determining the scope of the ATS, the Court first examined the
historical evidence pertaining to the enactment of the ATS by the First
Congress. At the founding, the law of nations consisted of two principle
elements: (1) judicial and executive norms of behavior governing the
relationship between States, and (2) common law regulating the behavior of
individuals outside domestic boundaries.48 However, there existed a sphere
in which these rules overlapped.49 In a narrow set of offenses against the
law of nations, such as the violations of safe conduct, ambassadorial rights,
and piracy, individuals could seek a judicial remedy in U.S. courts.50 Yet
37. Lucien J. Dhooge, Lohengrin Revealed: The Implications of Sosa v. AlvarezMachain for Human Rights Litigation Pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 393, 421 (2006).
38. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697–98.
39. Id. at 697.
40. Id. at 699.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 712.
44. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467,
1474–76 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that the ATS “creates a cause of action for violations of
specific, universal and obligatory international human rights standards”); Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 776–82 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (adhering
to the principles laid out in Filártiga).
45. See Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 11–23, Sosa,
542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339).
46. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 714–15.
49. Id. at 715.
50. Id.
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the conduct could also have serious implications on foreign relations.51 It is
within this purview that the members of the First Congress drafted the
Judiciary Act of 1789. 52
The First Congress likely enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789 to reinforce
the Court’s original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors and
diplomats under Article III of the Constitution.53 The Sosa Court made two
assumptions regarding the intent of the First Congress. First, the Court
found it unlikely that the very Congress empowering federal courts with
jurisdiction over claims alleging a violation of international law would not
take further action to create a cause of action for such claims. 54 Second, the
First Congress likely intended the ATS to have “practical effect the moment
it became law” for a limited number of violations.55 These violations
included those torts recognized by the First Congress as existing at the
intersection between individual remedies and foreign relations, including
offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and piracy
claims. 56 Although the ATS is a purely jurisdictional statute, the Court
concluded that it was “enacted on the understanding that the common law
would provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law
violations.” 57
Next, the Court rejected Sosa’s argument that the scope of international
law violations cognizable in ATS litigation was limited to those recognized
in 1789. 58 The Court acknowledged that, under Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 59 federal courts have no authority to derive general common law
(the Erie Doctrine). 60 However, the Erie Doctrine does not bar all judicial
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 717. The Framers of the Constitution vested the U.S. Supreme Court with
original jurisdiction over “all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and
Consuls” in response to the increasing concern that the federal government lacked the
judicial powers to manage effectively matters of an international character. U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2; see also Randall, supra note 19, at 19 (explaining the intent behind the ATS as “to
establish and extend the power of the federal judiciary over actions affecting foreign affairs
and involving aliens”).
54. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719.
55. Id. at 720, 724.
56. Id.; see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68 (identifying these
offenses as law of nations violations).
57. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
58. Id. at 712; see also STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 21, at 35 (characterizing the Court
as rejecting this “extreme interpretation”); Casto, supra note 27, at 645 (noting that if the
plaintiffs could only bring claims for torts recognized in 1789, the ATS “would be little more
than an antiquarian oddity”).
59. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie involved the question of whether a federal court could
disregard the common law rules of a state in cases of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 71. Federal
courts previously exercised independent judgment as to what the common law of the state
was or should have been. Id. However, the resulting difference between state and federal
adjudication within a jurisdiction caused plaintiffs to forum shop and resulted in inequitable
administration of the laws. See id. at 75. In light of these concerns, Erie held that courts had
no power to make general federal common law and, instead, must apply the laws of the state
where the court sits in diversity cases. Id. at 77–78.
60. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729. In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the
majority had manufactured new federal common law, contrary to Erie. Id. at 746–47 (Scalia,
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recognition of new substantive rules. 61 Federal courts may derive some
substantive law in limited circumstances.62 Courts have been doing so for
two centuries by recognizing the law of nations as part of federal common
law. 63
Yet the Court repeatedly emphasized the need for judicial caution in
recognizing any new cause of action under the law of nations. 64 In
particular, the Court acknowledged the following factors as counseling
toward limited recognition of ATS actions 65: (1) the substantial element of
discretion inherent in application of international law,66 (2) the limited role
of the judiciary following Erie, 67 (3) the superiority of legislative judgment
in the creation of a cause of action,68 (4) the potential foreign policy
implications of an ATS suit,69 and (5) the lack of a clear congressional
mandate to seek out new causes of action.70 As a result, the Court premised
its holding “on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant
doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms
today.” 71 Ultimately, the Court concluded that courts should require that
any claim based on the present-day law of nations “rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to” the modest number of violations recognized at
the time the ATS was enacted. 72
Sosa remains the sole Supreme Court case guiding ATS jurisprudence
within the federal court system. 73 The decision put to rest the question of
J., concurring). Justice Scalia claimed that, under an originalist perspective, the ATS did not
grant courts the right to recognize new federal common law claims for violations of the law
of nations. Id.
61. Id. at 729 (majority opinion).
62. Id. The Supreme Court has sanctioned the development of federal common law in
situations involving “‘uniquely federal interests.’” Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S.
500, 504 (1988) (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640
(1981)). An example of a type of case involving “uniquely federal interests” includes one
implicating U.S. foreign policy. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
63. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729–30; see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 426–27 (1964).
64. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–28.
65. Id. at 725–28. For one scholar’s understanding of these factors and how they can
provide an analytical roadmap for future ATS litigation, see Casto, supra note 27, at 645–68.
66. Although the legal community viewed law as able to be “found or discovered” at the
time the ATS was enacted, Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–26, the Court explained that law is now
acknowledged to be “a product of human choice.” Id. at 729.
67. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
68. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726 (“[T]he general practice has been to look for legislative
guidance before exercising innovative authority over substantive law.”).
69. Id.; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring) (describing the possibility that an ATS suit will interfere with U.S.
foreign affairs).
70. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728.
71. Id. at 729.
72. Id. at 725.
73. On September 30, 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case brought, in
part, under the ATS against foreign officials. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278,
2282–83 (2010). Although seen as an opportunity for the Court to scale back the expanding
scope of the ATS, the Court rested its decision squarely on foreign sovereign immunity
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which body of law—international or domestic—should guide the inquiry of
what constitutes a violation of the law of nations in an ATS lawsuit.74
Lower courts must recognize ATS claims for violations of “specific,
universal, and obligatory” norms, as defined by customary international
law. 75 Yet the Court left district courts to grapple with the question of
which body of law applies to define the potential perpetrators of a violation
of the law of nations. 76
Considering the principles laid out in Sosa, the next section of Part I
examines the well-settled use of international law in identifying an ATS
violation. The remaining section, Part I.C, explores the widely varied
choice of law principles courts have applied to determine who, in the
absence of guidance by the Supreme Court, can be liable under the ATS and
the disparities that occur as a result.
B. Use of International Law To Determine what Qualifies as a “Violation
of the Law of Nations”
A threshold question in any ATS case is whether the tort alleged by the
plaintiff is a violation of the law of nations. 77 In the wake of Sosa, courts
must examine customary international law to determine whether the alleged
tort is actionable under the ATS. 78 While the use of the ATS to redress
international law violations may be perceived as novel, the incorporation of
customary international law into federal common law was long settled prior
to Sosa. 79 Part I.B.1 identifies the sources of international law examined by
courts. Part I.B.2 discusses the way courts apply international law to ATS
litigation.

grounds. See Duncan Hollis, ATS vs. FSIA, ATS Wins?, OPINIO JURIS (June 1, 2010, 6:15
PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/06/01/ats-vs-fsia-ats-wins/ (“[H]uman rights activists
should be breathing a huge sigh of relief tonight. The Court had a chance here to gut the
ATS, and it declined to do so.”).
74. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 21, at 21; Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits
on Investor Liability in Human Rights Litigation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 278 (2009).
75. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (quoting In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights
Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
76. See infra Part.I.C.
77. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002), appeal dismissed per
stipulation, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 21, at 40.
78. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
79. See Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to
International Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 740, 740–43 (1939); supra notes 62–63 and
accompanying text (discussing Sosa’s conclusion that use of international sources of law has
long been recognized within the U.S. court system). But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the
Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 849–70 (1997) (arguing that the Erie Doctrine
abandoned the tradition of recognizing customary international law within federal common
law).
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1. Sources of International Law To Be Considered by U.S. Courts
The Supreme Court’s 1900 ruling in The Paquete Habana 80 held that the
judiciary must recognize customary international law as U.S. federal
common law under certain circumstances.81 Where no posited law
controlled, a court must resort to the “customs and usages of civilized
nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators,
who by years of labor . . . have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted
with the subjects.” 82 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has
continually affirmed the principle that domestic courts must acknowledge
certain sources of international law.83
The method described in The Paquete Habana is consistent with the
modern way courts identify principles of customary international law.84
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ
Statute) 85 has been recognized as the leading authority on sources of
international law within the United States. 86 The ICJ Statute provides four
types of authorities that a court should consider when determining
international law. 87 Although not everything that fits under this framework
qualifies as international law, these sources provide the means for proving
whether a rule has in fact attained status as international law.88
According to the ICJ Statute, a court must apply the general and
particular rules established within binding international conventions.89
However, in the absence of a binding treaty, customary international law
provides an additional source of international authority. 90 To discern
common practice by the international community, a court is directed to look
at whether state practice exists across nations and whether States believe
80. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
81. Id. at 700–01.
82. Id. at 700.
83. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 (2004) (turning to “those
[international] sources we have long, albeit cautiously, recognized”); Tex. Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (noting that “international disputes
implicating . . . our relations with foreign nations” are one of the “narrow areas” in which
federal common law exists); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423
(1964) (“United States courts apply international law as a part of our own in appropriate
circumstances.”).
84. See Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. CV 05-5133, 2010 WL 3969615, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
8, 2010) (discussing the impact of The Paquete Habana on the reasoning of modern day
courts).
85. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
1060 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
86. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 132 (2d Cir. 2010);
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880–81 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1980); MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (5th ed. 2003).
87. ICJ Statute, supra note 85, art. 38(1)(a)–(d).
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 103
cmt. a (1987); cf. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2003)
(describing customary international law as deriving from “myriad decisions made in
numerous and varied international and domestic arenas” and “not . . . from any single,
definitive, readily-identifiable source”).
89. ICJ Statute, supra note 85, art. 38(1)(a).
90. Id. art. 38(1)(b).

2870

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

that this practice is made obligatory by the rule of law, in other words,
opinio juris. 91 Although a practice may previously not have obtained status
as opinio juris, it is possible for “ancient usage” to “gradually ripen[] into a
rule of international law.” 92 Furthermore, the ICJ Statute instructs a court
to consider “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”93
Lastly, the judicial decisions and scholarship of the most highly regarded
publicists provide further evidence of the current state of international
law. 94 Accordingly, when examining an ATS claim, federal courts are
directed to consider these sources of international law.95
A court is entitled to consider all relevant international authorities in
making its determination, whether or not submitted by a party. 96 In
practice, a court will provide an exhaustive review of international treaties,
court precedent, and leading scholarship. 97 However, lower courts are still
bound to apply domestic common law interpretations of international law,
as decided by superior courts. 98 This often means that a lower court is
bound by Sosa’s examination of specific international authorities. The next
section discusses the ways in which the Supreme Court and lower courts
have examined sources of international law when determining whether a
defendant is liable.
2. Application of International Law in Sosa and Lower Courts
Courts consider a variety of international sources of law when
determining whether a defendant violated a “specific, universal, and
obligatory” norm of the law of nations. 99 In Sosa, the Supreme Court
91. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3,
41–42, ¶ 70–73 (Feb. 20); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. c (1987). Even if the United States was not party to a treaty,
domestic courts may still treat treaties as binding customary law if the treaty’s obligations
“passed into the general corpus of international law, and [are] now accepted as such by the
opinio juris.” Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 42, ¶ 71.
92. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1900).
93. ICJ Statute, supra note 85, art. 38(1)(c); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(4) (1987). For example, the general elements
of “natural justice,” including principles of equity and fairness, are considered a source of
law. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 50–55 (1991);
Frances T. Freeman Jalet, The Quest for the General Principles of Law Recognized by
Civilized Nations—A Study, 10 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1044–50 (1963).
94. ICJ Statute, supra note 85, art. 38(1)(d).
95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 (1987) (listing similar sources); see also United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
153, 160–61 (1820) (stating that the law of nations “may be ascertained by consulting the
works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of
nations; or by judicial decisions recognising and enforcing that law”).
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1. Courts are generally provided with wide discretion in
researching questions of international law. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F.
Supp. 2d 7, 18 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008).
97. See infra Part III.
98. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895); Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 160–61
(1820).
99. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (quoting In re Estate of
Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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examined a number of international sources in ultimately concluding that
plaintiff’s brief detention by Mexican and U.S. officials did not qualify as a
violation. 100 First, the Court examined the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights 101 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.102
The Court concluded that neither source created enforceable obligations,
opinio juris, and thus had not attained the status of binding customary
international law.103 Next, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on a
survey of national constitutions, an International Court of Justice (ICJ)
decision, and domestic federal law, finding that the authorities did not
define “arbitrary detention” with the specificity necessary for an ATS
violation. 104 Lastly, the Court found the requirement of “prolonged
arbitrary detention,” as set out by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, to be persuasive evidence of customary
international law.105 As a result, the Court held that Alvarez-Machain
advanced only aspirational norms that were not defined by international law
with enough specificity to support the creation of a federal remedy. 106
Using the standard set in Sosa, lower courts turn to various sources of
international law to define what torts are recognizable under the ATS. It is
now well settled that, in addition to the paradigmatic offenses recognized at
the ATS’s enactment, 107 there is universal acceptance of defined
prohibitions on torture, genocide, and certain war crimes within the
The legal
international community to meet the Sosa standard. 108
community generally considers these actions to be jus cogens 109 violations
of the law of nations. 110

100. Id. at 734–38.
101. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
102. art. 9, Dec 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
103. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 735; see supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text (discussing the
process in which treaties become part of customary international law). Rather than imposing
obligations, the treaties were viewed as articulating a set of aspirations for the international
community. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734–36. Furthermore, the United States only ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the express understanding that it
would not be enforceable in domestic courts. Id.
104. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734–38 & n.27.
105. Id. at 737 (discussing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 702 (1987)).
106. Id. at 738.
107. See supra notes 49–52, 56 and accompanying text (identifying offenses against
ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and piracy as recognized at the time the ATS was
enacted).
108. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987); Jeffrey M.
Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims:
The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 90–97
(1981).
109. Jus cogens refers to a “mandatory or peremptory norm of general international law
accepted and recognized by the international community as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 937 (9th ed. 2009); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. k (1987).
110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 cmt. n (1987); Blum
& Steinhardt, supra note 108, at 90.
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However, any prohibition that is a “specific, universal, and obligatory”
norm—whether jus cogens or not—is actionable under the ATS. 111 When
considering less accepted norms, a court must determine whether the
principles of customary international law warrant the creation of a new tort
remedy under the ATS. 112 Courts face a number of difficulties in making
this determination. There is still uncertainty among lower courts on how far
international prohibitions extend.113 Furthermore, courts apply conflicting
principles when attempting to define the elements of the violation.114 For
example, courts recently split on the significant question of which law
governs elements of aiding and abetting liability. 115 As a result, the regime
of aiding and abetting liability has been marked by substantial
uncertainty. 116 Additionally, courts question which sources of international
law should be consulted and given the most weight in applying the Sosa
standard. 117 This discussion is not to say that Sosa left doubt as to which
body of law applies when identifying a violation.118 Rather, the analysis
highlights the challenges courts often face in adjudicating ATS claims even
after following the principles articulated by Sosa. 119
After it is established that a certain tort is actionable under the ATS,
courts must next consider which defendants can be liable for that tort. The
next section discusses the various approaches available to courts to
111. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 n.15 (9th Cir. 2002), appeal dismissed per
stipulation, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,
Inc. (Talisman I), 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 306 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
112. Casto, supra note 27, at 646.
113. See, e.g., Viet. Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104,
119–23 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the prohibition on use of herbicides during the Vietnam
War was not universally accepted or sufficiently specific to be actionable); Roe I v.
Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1020–22 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (allowing only the
“worst forms” of child labor to be actionable); see also STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 21, at
205–14 (describing the types of claims that rarely meet the Sosa standard); Chimène I.
Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 69–70 &
nn.33–34 (2008) (discussing cases where courts have found that the underlying violation did
not meet the Sosa standard).
114. Compare Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. (Talisman II), 582
F.3d 244, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2009) (requiring that a defendant act with purpose to meet the
mens rea element of aiding and abetting liability), with Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402
F.3d 1148, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2005) (identifying knowledge of illegality as sufficient).
115. See supra note 114 (comparing the conflicting definitions of an element of aiding
and abetting liability based on application of international or domestic law); see also Keitner,
supra note 113, at 62.
116. Jonathan Drimmer, The Aiding and Abetting Conundrum Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, LEXISNEXIS EXPERT COMMENTARY, June 2008, at 1; see also In re Sinaltrainal
Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (describing the “pressing need for
clarification of these issues”); Keitner, supra note 113, at 62 (“The doctrinal question of
what standards govern accomplice liability continues to perplex courts . . . .”).
117. Compare Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 177–87 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding
concrete evidence that non-consensual medical experimentation violated the law of nations
based on the Nuremberg Tribunals and incorporation into conventions, declarations, and
domestic laws), with id. at 195–97 (Wesley, J., dissenting) (arguing that evidence of
customary international law should primarily be deduced from treaties).
118. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
119. Cf. Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The
question of defining ‘the law of nations’ is a confusing one which is hotly debated . . . .”).
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determine who, in the absence of well-established choice of law principles,
can be liable under the ATS.
C. Determining Who Can Be Liable for a “Violation of the Law of
Nations” Based on International and Domestic Law
The Supreme Court has never ruled on what categories of defendants can
be held liable for a violation of the law of nations, nor has the Court
indicated which body of law—domestic or international—should control
this inquiry. Particularly with the infusion of corporate defendants into
ATS litigation, courts have only recently begun to analyze the question.
Part I.C.1 identifies the Supreme Court’s limited discussion of who can be
held liable under the ATS. The following section, Part I.C.2, discusses the
advent of corporations into ATS litigation. The remaining section, Part
I.C.3, considers the divergent treatment of corporate entities under
international and domestic law.
1. The Lack of Guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court
The Court’s holdings in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Co., 120 and Sosa may be construed as offering lower courts limited
direction on the question of who may be liable under the ATS. In Amerada,
the Court considered whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (FSIA) 121 afforded the Republic of Argentina immunity from an ATS
suit and thus deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the
claim. 122 Although the Court ultimately determined that Congress intended
the FSIA to be the sole way of obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign, the Court briefly discussed the scope of the ATS.123
Specifically, the Court concluded that “[t]he Alien Tort Statute by its terms
[did] not distinguish among classes of defendants, and it of course has the
same effect after the passage of the FSIA as before with respect to
defendants other than foreign states.” 124

120. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
121. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f) 1441(d), 1602–1611 (2006). The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) eliminated the ability of U.S. courts to hear cases
against sovereign governments, except under limited circumstances. Id. § 1604 (“[A] foreign
state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States except as provided in [the exceptions] of this chapter.”). Prior to the enactment of the
FSIA, defendants often received immunity under existing common law. See Samantar v.
Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2284–86 (2010).
122. See Amerada, 488 U.S. at 428. On appeal from the district court’s decision, the
Second Circuit held that the ATS was “‘no more than a jurisdictional grant based on
international law’” and that “‘who [was] within’ the scope of that grant was governed by
‘evolving standards of international law.’” Id. at 433 (quoting Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.
v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425 (2d Cir. 1987)) (alteration added). The Second
Circuit concluded that the enactment of the FSIA was not meant to eliminate the ATS’s
grant of subject matter jurisdiction to foreign plaintiffs. See id. The Supreme Court fully
rejected this argument. Id. at 433–35.
123. See id. at 438.
124. Id.
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While Sosa involved an ATS claim against government officials, the
Court explicitly referenced the possibility of suits against other types of
defendants. 125 In footnote twenty of Sosa (footnote twenty), the Court
noted that a “related consideration” for whether a norm is sufficiently
definite to support a cause of action “is whether international law extends
the scope of liability . . . to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a
private actor such as a corporation or individual.” 126 In making this
statement, the Court contrasted two opposing views on whether a private
actor, rather than a state actor, could violate international law.127
Furthermore, Justice Breyer’s concurrence made reference to the type of
defendant being held accountable for violating international law.128 Justice
Breyer interpreted the Court’s opinion as requiring that “[t]he norm . . .
extend liability to the type of perpetrator (e.g., a private actor) the plaintiff
seeks to sue.” 129 In making this observation, Justice Breyer cited to
footnote twenty of the majority opinion.130 As Part II of this Note will
examine further, courts contest the relevance of footnote twenty in
adjudicating the question of whether a corporation can violate the ATS. 131
The next section identifies the changes to ATS litigation with the
introduction of corporate defendants. The last section of Part I.C analyzes
the differences in corporate liability depending on whether a court applies
domestic or international law.
2. Corporations as a New Class of Defendants
Against this muddled legal background, foreign plaintiffs have
increasingly brought suits against a variety of defendants for acts in
violation of the law of nations. 132 For the first fifteen years after Filártiga
and the birth of modern ATS claims, aliens brought ATS suits in U.S.
courts only against individuals or foreign States. 133 The first ATS case
where a plaintiff alleged that a corporate entity violated the law of nations
was as recent as 1997. 134

125. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004).
126. Id. (comparing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 744, 791–95 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (holding that private actors could not be liable), with Kadic
v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239–41 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that a private actor could violate
the law of nations)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 760 (Breyer, J., concurring).
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. See infra Part II.
132. ELSEA, supra note 16, at 15.
133. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 116–17 (2d Cir. 2010); see
also Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 965 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring)
(“It is the rare [ATS] case that does not involve a foreign state or official as a defendant.”),
appeal dismissed per stipulation, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); supra notes 120–24 and
accompanying text (discussing an example of a case involving a foreign sovereign).
134. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116–17.
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In Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 135 the Central District of California considered
a complaint alleging that Unocal Corp., a U.S. oil company, acted in
collusion with the government of Myanmar while working as a joint
venture for construction of a gas pipeline in Burma. 136 The Burmese
plaintiffs claimed that the Burmese military had committed a number of
international law violations during the period that they undertook the
project. 137 After the district court granted Unocal’s motion for summary
judgment, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that a corporation may be
held liable under the ATS for knowingly providing assistance to the
perpetrators of a crime. 138
First, the court addressed the threshold question of whether the alleged
torts of forced labor, murder, rape, and torture could qualify as violations of
Relying on international agreements and
the law of nations. 139
declarations 140 and on circuit interpretations of international law,141 the
Ninth Circuit found that these torts qualified as violations of the law of
nations. 142
Next, the court considered the additional threshold question of whether
the alleged tort requires that the party engage in state action.143 Prior to
Unocal, the Second Circuit in Kadic v. Karadžić 144 clarified previous
divided holdings on the state action requirement under the ATS. 145 The
court concluded that although individual acts of rape and torture are
“proscribed by international law only when committed by state officials or
under color of law,” these acts are actionable when collectively committed
in pursuit of a larger campaign of genocide or war crimes. 146 Specifically,
these jus cogens violations are actionable under the ATS regardless of state
action. 147 Finding the Second Circuit’s reasoning persuasive, the Ninth
Circuit held that Unocal Corp., as a private actor, could be held liable for
the alleged torts regardless of whether the entity acted under color of
Burmese law. 148

135. 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
136. Id. at 937.
137. See id. at 936–37.
138. Id. at 945.
139. Id.
140. Id. (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 101, art. 23, among
others).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. The argument that individuals cannot be subject to jurisdiction is based on a
rigid understanding of international law as solely law between states. Keitner, supra note
113, at 70.
144. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
145. Id. at 240 (adopting and extending Judge Harry T. Edwards’s concurrence in TelOren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794–95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring)); see also STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 21, at 252 (addressing Kadic’s “color of
law” analysis).
146. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243.
147. Id. at 242–44.
148. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 945–46.
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Although the Unocal court extended liability to corporate ATS
defendants, the court did not distinguish between corporate entities and
private individuals.149 Rather, the Ninth Circuit premised corporate
liability on whether international law holds a private actor, versus a public
actor, liable for the alleged torts.150
Since the Unocal complaint was filed in federal court, nearly 140 cases
alleging human rights violations under the ATS have been brought against
corporate defendants across the country. 151 This trend likely reflects the
increasing attractiveness of corporate defendants to plaintiffs seeking
redress of international law violations.152 Generally, large corporations
have sufficient assets to make settlements or judgments more worthwhile
for plaintiffs. 153 Unlike the difficulty plaintiffs face when suing sovereign
defendants, 154 multinational corporations are not entitled to foreign
immunities under the FSIA because they are private actors.155 Therefore,
the plaintiffs do not see their cases dismissed on subject matter jurisdiction
grounds like in earlier ATS actions involving claims against foreign
governments. 156 Additionally, corporations are often likely to opt for
settlement. 157
149. See generally id.
150. See id. at 945–46. Generally, the state action doctrine now requires that private
actors act in concert with state officials or receive state aid, with the limited exceptions being
in situations of jus cogens violations, i.e., alleged slave trading, piracy, genocide, and war
crimes. Keitner, supra note 113, at 71; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987) (conferring jurisdiction over private
actors for certain offenses recognized by nations “as of universal concern”); id. § 702
(recognizing jurisdiction over a state for genocide, slavery, murder or disappearance of
persons, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination, and a pattern
of gross violations of recognized rights); supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text.
151. Jonathan C. Drimmer, Is Second Circuit Ruling a “Talisman” Against Alien Tort
Statute Suits?, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. Legal Found., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 12,
2010, at 1, available at http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/02-1510Drimmer_LegalBackgrounder.pdf; see also Ramsey, supra note 74, at 278–79. Like
Unocal, cases involving corporate defendants often rest their holdings on whether a private
actor, as opposed to a public actor, can be held liable. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank
Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 282–83 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (noting that courts
often treat “the issue of whether corporations may be held liable under the [ATS as]
indistinguishable from the question of whether private individuals may be”). Part II of this
Note discusses the few cases explicitly addressing the question of whether a corporate entity,
as opposed to an individual, may be liable under the ATS. See infra Part II.
152. Marc J. Gottridge & Matthew J. Galvin, The Alien Tort Statute: An Introduction and
Current Topics, 826 PRACTISING L. INST. 87, 102 (2010), available at 826 PLI/Lit 87.
153. Id.; see also Keitner, supra note 113, at 64 & n.11; Ramsey, supra note 74, at 279.
154. See Cynthia R.L. Fairweather, Obstacles To Enforcing International Human Rights
Law in Domestic Courts, 4 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 119, 120–22 (1998); supra notes
121–23 and accompanying text.
155. See Gottridge & Galvin, supra note 152, at 102 (discussing Unocal as an example,
where the court dismissed the Government of Myanmar but kept the corporate defendants in
the action); see also STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 21, at 22–23; Ramsey, supra note 74, at
279.
156. See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Order, Estate of Albazzaz v. Prince, No. 1:09cv616 (E.D. Va. Jan. 6,
2010), ECF No. 102 (settling claims against private government contractor Blackwater and
its founder, Erik Prince); Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release, Wiwa v. Shell
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However, ATS lawsuits against corporate defendants are not without
their difficulties for plaintiffs. These claims are often dismissed on a
number of procedural grounds. In Sosa, the Court suggested that the
plaintiffs might need to exhaust local remedies in particular situations
before seeking U.S. jurisdiction under the ATS. 158 As a result, many
corporate defendants seek dismissal under the principle of forum non
conveniens and often see their motions granted. 159 Moreover, in light of
the difficulties in pleading facts regarding a foreign crime, plaintiffs face
increasing difficulty in meeting the pleading standard recently set forth by
the Supreme Court. 160 Furthermore, as discussed in Unocal, the state
action requirement greatly limits the susceptibility of corporate defendants
to suit in cases not involving jus cogens violations. 161
Procedural limitations pose a number of obstacles for foreign plaintiffs
seeking recovery against corporate defendants under the ATS. However,
recent cases that more fundamentally question the exercise of jurisdiction
over a corporation under the ATS pose a far greater danger to plaintiffs.162
Corporate liability for a violation of the law of nations is largely dependent
on whether a court employs international or domestic law.163 The
following section discusses the divergent outcomes arising from the
application of these two bodies of law.
3. Differences in Corporate Liability Depending on Whether International
or Domestic Law Applies
As abstract, artificial beings, corporations are viewed as “judicial
persons” by the legal system. 164 This term reflects the character of a
corporate entity as fundamentally a creation of the law and only possessing

Petroleum, N.V., No. 96-cv-8386 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2009), ECF No. 520 (resolving
allegations that company aided Nigerian military in violating the rights of an indigenous
group for $11 million); Order, Xiaoning v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 07-02151 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28,
2007), ECF No. 115 (settling claims alleging Yahoo! aided and abetted Chinese government
by providing state with information regarding dissenters).
158. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 721 (2004).
159. See, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283, 1300 (11th
Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of suit on forum non conveniens grounds); Aguinda v.
Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002) (dismissing suit by Ecuadorian citizens based
on forum non conveniens doctrine).
160. See, e.g., Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009)
(dismissing complaint because allegations did not meet heightened pleading standard set in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)); Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. CV 05-5133, 2010 WL
3969615, at *35 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010) (same).
161. See David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human
Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 941
(2004); supra notes 143–50 and accompanying text.
162. See infra Part II.B.
163. For an extensive analysis of the ways courts apply international and domestic law
within the context of corporate liability, see infra Part II.
164. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, *467; see also Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 517, 636 (1819).
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those properties conferred upon it by the law. 165 These “judicial persons”
are granted a varying degree of rights, obligations, and duties depending on
whether domestic or international law applies.
Common law in the United States has long recognized the corporate
entity as a “legal person.” 166 In New York Central & Hudson River
Railroad Co. v. United States, 167 the Supreme Court first acknowledged
that the changing nature of society demanded that corporations be held
accountable, just as individuals are, for illegal conduct. 168 In holding that
corporations are fully liable, the Court rejected the notion that a corporate
entity could not commit a crime solely because of its organization and
nature. 169 Today, U.S. statutory law often treats corporations and
individuals similarly. 170 Additionally, companies are afforded a patchwork
of constantly evolving rights 171 and responsibilities under U.S. law. 172
The place of corporations within the international legal landscape is not
nearly as clear. Traditionally, corporate entities were not viewed as
“subjects” of international law. 173 Rather, corporate law was almost
exclusively a domestic matter.174
An examination of corporate nationality and shareholder rights by the
ICJ illustrates this traditional viewpoint. In 1958 and 1962, the Belgian
government filed suit for reparations from the Spanish government, alleging
that organs of Spain caused damage to Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Ltd., a Canadian company, and, as a result, injured Belgian
shareholders. 175 In its decision, the ICJ stated that:
165. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636; Asbury Hosp. v. Cass Cnty., 7 N.W.2d 438,
449–50 (N.D. 1943); see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, *467.
166. See Cook Cnty. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 125 (2003)
(examining sources confirming “the common understanding . . . that corporations were
‘persons’ in the general enjoyment of the capacity to sue and be sued”); N.Y. Cent. &
Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495–96 (1909) (recognizing that the
changed nature of the economy requires that courts hold corporations accountable);
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 667 (noting that corporations possessed the capacity to be
sued at common law).
167. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
168. Id. at 495–96.
169. Id. at 492–96.
170. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress,
unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the [word] ‘person’ [includes] corporations.”);
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(2) (2006) (“The term person means . . . a
corporation . . . .”); FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1182 (2011) (“We have no doubt
that ‘person,’ in a legal setting, often refers to artificial entities.”).
171. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (Free Speech Clause of First
Amendment); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977) (limited Fourth
Amendment rights); Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (Due Process
Clause of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118
U.S. 394 (1886) (Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
172. See, e.g., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–
1968 (2006); In re Temporomandibular Joint Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484,
1495–97 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying the common law standard for aiding and abetting to
corporations).
173. Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 161, at 944.
174. Id. at 937.
175. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 1 (Feb. 5).
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[I]nternational law has had to recognize the corporate entity
as
an
institution created by States in a domain essentially within their domestic
jurisdiction. This in turn requires that, whenever legal issues arise
concerning the rights of States with regard to the treatment of companies
and shareholders, as to which rights international law has not established
its own rules, it has to refer to the relevant rules of municipal law. 176

The court concluded that international law only authorizes the national state
of the company alone to bring suit on behalf of shareholders. 177 However,
the court noted that the way international law recognizes corporate activity
may be changing. Municipal institutions, such as the corporate entity,
increasingly cross borders and transform the relations between States.178
As a result, international law continues to evolve in response to the
transformation of international economic relations. 179 The ICJ suggested
that perhaps customary international law should have already developed
rules governing the international activities of corporations. 180
Today, a substantial body of international law recognizes the corporate
entity in some capacity. Corporations have a number of duties and
obligations under international law.181 Corporate entities are indirectly
bound by specific international obligations directly imposed on States.182
Furthermore, corporations can be held civilly liable for certain violations of
international environmental law. 183 It is also possible for corporations to
enforce their rights in a variety of international legal fora, including the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, the IranUnited States Claims Tribunals, and the United Nations Claims

176. Id. ¶ 38.
177. Id. ¶ 78.
178. Id. ¶ 38.
179. Id. ¶ 39.
180. See id. ¶ 89 (“[I]t may at first sight appear surprising that the evolution of law has
not gone further and that no generally accepted rules in the matter have crystallized on the
international plane.”).
181. See, e.g., Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2
(Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Human Rights Norms for Corporations] (discussing the
obligation of businesses to respect human dignity); U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development, The Social Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/Misc. 21 (Oct. 1999) (requiring that transnational corporations abide by
responsible business practices); see also Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 161, at 949–60
(discussing these various duties of corporations, otherwise known as “soft law” obligations).
182. U.N. Human Rights Norms for Corporations, supra note 181, pmbl. (listing various
international instruments that indirectly bind corporations).
183. See, e.g., Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities
Dangerous to the Environment art. 2, ¶ 6, June 21, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1228 (defining person as
any entity, “whether corporate or not”); International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage art. 1, ¶ 2, Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Convention on Oil
Pollution] (binding any person, “whether corporate or not”); Vienna Convention on Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage art. 1(1)(a), May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention] (imposing liability on “any private or public body whether corporate or
not” for nuclear damage).
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Commission. 184 These treaties may demonstrate that international law
recognizes the corporate entity in some form. 185
Within the context of human rights, the international community
acknowledges that international law must in some way monitor the
behavior of corporations. 186 In the Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, the United Nations recognized that corporations have the
obligation to promote, respect, and protect human rights as established by
international and national laws.187 To ensure compliance with this
aspiration, the document proposed that corporations establish internal
compliance regimes and allow periodic monitoring by international
organizations. 188 Additionally, the statement suggested that States establish
the necessary legal framework for assuring that corporations comply with
these norms and award the necessary damages to those affected by a
company’s failure to comply. 189
On going debate exists over whether customary international law
recognizes corporate liability for a violation of the law of nations. 190 The
question of whether corporations can be held civilly liable under the ATS is
largely dependent on whether a court chooses to apply international or
domestic law.191 However, Supreme Court precedent gives little indication
of which body of law courts should draw upon in making this
determination.192 Part II examines the varied approaches that different
courts employ to address whether a corporation can be liable under the
ATS.
II. THE INCREASING CONFUSION OVER WHETHER A CORPORATE
DEFENDANT CAN BE LIABLE FOR A “VIOLATION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS”
The divergent application of Sosa’s principles by lower courts has
created high levels of uncertainty for ATS litigants.193 Specifically, when
answering the question of whether corporations can be subject to liability
under the ATS, courts utilize a variety of approaches that are rooted in
184. See Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 161, at 947.
185. See id. at 948. For a broad discussion of these treaties and more international
decisions in favor of corporate liability, see Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human
Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 475–88 (2001).
186. See U.N. Human Rights Norms for Corporations, supra note 181, pmbl.
187. Id. ¶ 1.
188. Id. ¶¶ 15–16.
189. Id. ¶¶ 17–18; see also U.N. Report of the Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on
the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,
Promotion of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Including the Right To Development, ¶ 87, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/13 (Apr. 22, 2009) (“States
are required to take appropriate steps to investigate, punish and redress corporate-related
abuse of the rights of individuals within their territory and/or jurisdiction—in short, to
provide access to remedy.”).
190. See infra Part II.A–B.
191. See supra Part I.C.3.
192. See supra Part I.C.1.
193. See supra notes 111–19 and accompanying text.
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international law, domestic law, or an overlay of both sets of principles.
The following section, Part II.A, identifies cases where courts have either
implicitly or expressly held that corporations can violate the law of nations.
Part II.B addresses the recent jurisprudence of a number of courts finding
that corporate entities cannot be defendants under the ATS.
A. The Different Rationales for Holding Corporations Accountable Under
the ATS
Courts frequently rule on ATS cases involving corporate defendants 194 or
impose liability 195 on these defendants without specifically addressing
whether corporate entities can be held liable (precedent sub silentio).196
Rather, corporate liability is often assumed without any discussion. 197
Additionally, some courts have explicitly stated that they are assuming that
corporations can be held liable under the ATS.198 Although substantial in
terms of volume, these courts provide no rationale behind their decisions
and, thus, provide little meaningful insight into the issue of corporate

194. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 174–75, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2009)
(concluding that jurisdiction over corporate defendants existed for nonconsensual medical
experimentation on humans because universally accepted norms of customary international
law prohibited the conduct); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1202–03 (9th Cir.
2007) (affirming the lower court’s finding that jurisdiction existed over nonfrivolous claims
asserted against mining corporation for vicarious liability of jus cogens norms), remanded in
part on other grounds, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
473 F.3d 345, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (upholding the lower court’s denial of oil company’s
motion to dismiss on political questions grounds); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440,
449 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that corporate defendants did not act in concert with the state to
be liable); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that
the court had personal jurisdiction over energy companies but that the action must be
dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds); Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d
988, 1012–15 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (holding that allegations of forced labor by multinational
company did not fall within the meaning well-established under international law); Mujica v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1183 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (allowing claim to
proceed against oil company and private security firm); supra notes 149–50 and
accompanying text (discussing Unocal).
195. See Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 584 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2008)
(holding that Cuban nationals were entitled to between fifteen and twenty million dollars
each in compensatory damages and ten million dollars each in punitive damages from
corporate defendants for human trafficking and forced labor); see also Judgment in a Civil
Trial, Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., No. 08-CV-1659 (BMC) (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 6, 2009), ECF No. 48 (jury verdict of $1.5 million in compensatory damages and
$250,000 in punitive damages against corporate defendant for torture claim).
196. Precedent sub silentio refers to cases where issues are passed on in silence, without
being expressly mentioned. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 109, at 1296.
197. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 161 & n.12 (2d Cir. 2010)
(Leval, J., concurring) (collecting cases involving corporate defendants where liability was
“assumed”).
198. See, e.g., Talisman II, 582 F.3d 244, 261 n.12 (2d Cir. 2009) (“We will also assume,
without deciding, that corporations . . . may be held liable for the violations of customary
international law . . . .”); Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113–14 (5th Cir.
1988) (assuming that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the corporate defendant
because it was “unnecessary to decide” the question).
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liability. As a result, substantial disagreement exists over whether these
cases qualify as binding authority. 199
However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,200 U.S.
District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, 201 and
a concurring judge within the Second Circuit, 202 have expressly concluded
that ATS liability can properly be imposed upon corporate entities. In
doing so, these courts often rely on the decisions of courts where liability
was assumed to hold that liability is appropriate in the current case.
1. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit is the only circuit to have explicitly ruled in support
of corporate liability under the ATS. 203 In Romero v. Drummond Co., 204 a
labor union, its leaders, and relatives of its deceased leaders brought an
ATS action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
against the mining company Drummond. 205 The plaintiffs alleged that,
under the direction of corporate executives in the United States, the
company hired paramilitaries affiliated with the United Self-Defense Forces
of Colombia to torture the union leaders.206 On appeal, the defendants
argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the
ATS did not allow suits against corporations. 207
The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court properly exercised
subject matter jurisdiction over Drummond under the ATS. 208 The court
relied on two arguments in deciding that the ATS permitted suits against
corporate defendants. First, the court cited its prior decision in Aldana v.
Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc. 209 In Aldana, the court found that the
plaintiffs had properly stated a claim under the ATS against a corporate
defendant. 210 The Aldana court simply assumed that a corporate entity
could be held liable without any discussion of the issue. 211 Nonetheless,
the Eleventh Circuit, in Romero, characterized itself as “bound by that
precedent.” 212 Next, the Eleventh Circuit briefly addressed the text of the
199. Compare In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 58–59
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (listing cases and finding that “the disposition of these cases is inconsistent
with the assertion that no claim under the ATS can be brought against corporations”), aff’d,
517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008), with Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 124–25 (holding that the fact that the
court has decided ATS cases involving corporations “does not foreclose consideration of the
issue”).
200. Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008).
201. Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 58; Talisman I, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 319
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
202. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149 (Leval, J., concurring).
203. See Gottridge & Galvin, supra note 152, at 122.
204. 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008).
205. Id. at 1309.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1314.
208. Id. at 1315.
209. 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005).
210. Id. at 1250; see also Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315.
211. Gottridge & Galvin, supra note 152, at 122; see also Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1250.
212. Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315.
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Because the statute provided no express exception for
statute. 213
corporations, the court concluded that corporations were not immune from
suit. 214
In concluding that corporations could be liable, the Eleventh Circuit
engaged in no substantive analysis of customary international law.215
Rather, the court relied upon its silence in past cases and the express text of
the statute. The Eleventh Circuit cited favorably to Romero in a subsequent
ATS case, where the court again rejected defendants’ argument that
corporations could not be held liable under the statute.216 As such, the
issue of corporate liability is viewed as a settled question within the
Eleventh Circuit. 217
A number of district courts have also concluded that the ATS applies to
corporate defendants. In particular, two district court opinions from the
Second Circuit—Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.
(Talisman I) 218 and In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation219—
provide the most extensive examination of the question. 220 Although these
cases are no longer binding in light of the Second Circuit’s holding in
Kiobel, other jurisdictions draw heavily upon these cases in concluding that
corporations can commit a violation of the law of nations. 221 As a result,
these cases remain highly instructive on the issue that this Note seeks to
address. 222
2. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
Although the Second Circuit decided Filártiga, the first modern ATS
case, in 1980, 223 the first case to address the question of corporate liability

213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Gottridge & Galvin, supra note 152, at 122.
216. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009).
217. Cf. Gottridge & Galvin, supra note 152, at 122.
218. 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
219. 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
220. See Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. CV 05-5133, 2010 WL 3969615, at *61 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 8, 2010).
221. See, e.g., Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 753–54 (D. Md. 2010)
(discussing Romero, Talisman I, and Agent Orange); In re XE Servs. Alien Tort Litig., 665
F. Supp. 2d 569, 588 (E.D. Va. 2009) (discussing Talisman I and Agent Orange); see also
Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *61 (“Many other courts have relied almost exclusively on the
reasoning employed by these two decisions.”).
222. Without providing extensive analysis, a number of other district courts also
expressly reject the argument that a corporation cannot be held liable under the ATS. See,
e.g., Al-Quraishi, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 753–54 (determining that the law of nations extends to
corporations based on domestic precedent); XE Servs., 665 F. Supp. 2d at 588 (holding that
nothing in Sosa may be read to distinguish between private and public actors); Bowoto v.
Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506, 2006 WL 2455752, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006)
(finding that once “an international norm has been sufficiently well established to reach
private actors, there is very little reason to differentiate between corporations and
individuals”).
223. See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see also supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
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within the circuit was decided in 2003.224 In Talisman I, a group of
plaintiffs alleged that Talisman Energy, Inc., a large Canadian energy
company, participated with the Sudanese government in the ethnic
cleansing of the non-Muslim Sudanese population within the country’s
southern oil fields. 225 According to the complaint, Talisman aided this
genocidal policy for the purpose of facilitating exploitative oil activities in
the region. 226 Talisman moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, in part, claiming that a corporation is legally incapable
of violating the law of nations. 227
The Southern District of New York rejected the company’s argument.
The court held that corporations could be liable for violations of the law of
nations, “particularly when their actions constitute jus cogens
violations.” 228 In making this determination, the court cited a “considerable
body” of domestic and international precedent in support of its holding. 229
Because the district court decided Talisman I prior to Sosa, the court
started its review of domestic precedent with Second Circuit decisions.230
The court offered an extensive review of circuit precedent, beginning with
the birth of ATS litigation in Filártiga, 231 through Kadic’s extension of
liability to individuals, 232 to more recent cases brought against corporate
defendants. 233 The court concluded that Second Circuit precedent indicates
that imposition of liability on corporations is the norm, not the exception, in
ATS jurisprudence. 234
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that sub silentio precedent
could not support a finding of corporate liability. 235 Because subject matter
jurisdiction is fundamental in determining whether a court may hear a case,
it is the duty of any court to consider if jurisdiction is proper even if the
parties do not raise the issue. 236 Therefore, if corporate entities were
incapable of being subject to jurisdiction, prior courts had the legal duty to
address the issue sua sponte. 237 By not dismissing prior ATS cases against

224. See Talisman I, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
225. Id. at 296.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 308. Talisman primarily relied on the opinions of two esteemed international
legal scholars, James Crawford and Christopher Greenwood. Id. These scholars submitted
affidavits examining international law to conclude that a corporate entity cannot be liable. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 309.
232. Id. at 309–11.
233. Id. at 311–13 (discussing Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002);
Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2000); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998)).
234. Id. at 319.
235. Id. at 312.
236. Id. at 312–13.
237. Id. A court is considered to act sua sponte when it issues a ruling without prompting
or suggestion by the parties. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 109, at 1560.
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corporations, the Second Circuit “tacitly acknowledged that subject matter
jurisdiction lay in that case.” 238
The district court then examined the weight of international precedent in
favor of its conclusion. 239 The court rejected Talisman’s argument that
because the Nuremberg Tribunals (the Tribunals) held individuals and not
their corporate entities liable following World War II, the Tribunal did not
consider corporations liable. 240 Rather, the court found informative the
language of the Tribunals, which spoke in terms of corporate liability.241
This language showed that the Tribunals considered corporations culpable
and thus formed the basis for the concept of corporate liability for jus
Next, the court examined numerous treaties
cogens violations. 242
pertaining to the environment, which impose liability directly upon
corporate entities.243 Because a number of treaties impose liability on
corporations for unintentional toxic torts, “logic would suggest that they can
be held liable for intentional torts such as complicity in genocide, slave
Lastly, the court noted that international
trading, or torture.” 244
organizations, such as the United Nations and the European Union, impose
various duties on corporate behavior to ensure that human rights are
respected. 245
As a result of the lengthy analysis of domestic and international
precedent, the court concluded that when the plaintiffs alleged jus cogens
violations, corporations can be subject to liability. 246 The court stated that
this “result should hardly be surprising” considering that a private
corporation has no immunity under U.S. or international law, and there is
no logical reason to provide such an immunity. 247 Although the court never
explicitly discussed what body of law controlled its inquiry, its examination
238. Talisman I, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 312.
239. Id. at 315–18.
240. Id. at 315–16; see also Gwynne Skinner, Nuremberg’s Legacy Continues: The
Nuremberg Trials’ Influence on Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts Under the Alien
Tort Statute, 71 ALB. L. REV. 321, 344–45 (2008). Formed as military courts following
World War II by the London Charter, the U.S. and British Nuremberg Tribunals (the
Tribunals) prosecuted German corporate executives for the various ways they contributed to
the atrocities. See Allison Marston Danner, The Nuremberg Industrialist Prosecutions and
Aggressive War, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 651, 653 (2006); see also Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82
U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Charter] (establishing the Tribunals). Courts increasingly
look to the Tribunals for guidance on the scope of corporate liability under the ATS. See
Skinner, supra, at 326.
241. Talisman I, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 316 (discussing United States v. Krupp, Control
Council No. 10 (Dec. 20, 1945), quoted in Ratner, supra note 185, at 477–78 n.134); see
Skinner, supra note 240, at 344–45.
242. Talisman I, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 316; see Skinner, supra note 240, at 344–45.
243. Talisman I, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 316–18 (citing Vienna Convention, supra note 183,
art. 2(1); Convention on Oil Pollution, supra note 183, art. 3(1), among others).
244. Id. at 317.
245. Id. at 317–18 (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 101). But
see supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text (Sosa rejecting the plaintiff’s reliance on the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as evidence).
246. Talisman I, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
247. Id.
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of international precedent suggests that the court considered international
law as governing.
3. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
Two years following Talisman I, a second district court within the
Second Circuit concluded that ATS liability could be imposed on corporate
entities. The Eastern District of New York analyzed corporate liability in
Agent Orange. 248 The court dismissed a complaint brought by Vietnamese
nationals and the Vietnamese Association for Victims of Agent
Orange/Dioxin against corporations based in the United States for
violations of international and domestic law.249 Specifically, the plaintiffs
alleged that the companies manufactured and supplied herbicides to the
United States and South Vietnam, who then sprayed and spilled the
chemicals in Vietnam from 1961 to 1975.250 The party sought damages for
the deaths and exposure to the herbicides of the plaintiffs under the ATS, in
addition to environmental clean-up costs, abatement, and disgorgement of
profits. 251
In their motion to dismiss, defendants argued that customary
international law did not extend to corporate behavior.252 Although the
court recognized that there was “substantial support for this position,”253 it
held that a corporation was not immune from civil liability based on
international law.254 First, Judge Jack B. Weinstein rested on general
principles of fairness and logic in stating there existed no reason why
corporations should not be held liable to the same extent as individuals
under the ATS. 255 The court noted that:
Limiting civil liability to individuals while exonerating the corporation
directing the individual’s action through its complex operations and
changing personnel makes little sense in today’s world. . . . Our vital
private activities are conducted primarily under corporate auspices, only
corporations have the wherewithal to respond to massive toxic tort suits,
and changing personnel means that those individuals who acted on behalf
of the corporation and for its profit are often gone or deceased before they
or the corporation can be brought to justice. 256

248. 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
249. Id. at 15.
250. Id. at 27.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 54–55.
253. Id. at 55. The court noted that many of the sources of international law cited by the
defendants concerned criminal liability. Id. at 57. However, “limitations on criminal liability
of corporations do not necessarily apply to civil liability of corporations.” Id.
254. Id. at 58.
255. See id. at 58–59; see also Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. CV 05-5133, 2010 WL 3969615,
at *62 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010) (characterizing Agent Orange’s argument as based on
general principles of fairness).
256. Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 58.
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According to the court, international law in no way immunizes corporations
from civil legal actions. 257
Next, the court adopted a portion of an amicus brief that addressed the
weight of precedent in favor of its decision.258 Amici stated that the
Supreme Court had “acknowledged that corporations can be sued under the
ATS” in footnote twenty of Sosa. 259 Furthermore, the brief cited to a
number of Second Circuit cases where the court considered claims against
corporations for breach of international law without expressly addressing
corporate culpability. 260 Amici contended that the disposition of these
cases was inherently inconsistent with the defendants’ argument that
corporations were not subject to ATS liability. 261 Similar to Romero, the
court relied on precedent sub silentio to conclude that courts had already
acknowledged corporate defendants as potentially culpable.262 The court
also acknowledged that the Talisman I court affirmatively decided the issue
of corporate liability under the ATS.263 In particular, no court had ever
presented a policy reason for why corporations should be immune from
ATS liability, and Judge Weinstein declined to find differently. 264
Lastly, the court held that even if domestic law applied, corporate
defendants could still be sued under the ATS. 265 Ultimately, the Supreme
Court had “made clear that an ATS claim is a federal common law claim
and it is a bedrock tenet of American law that corporations can be held
liable for their torts.” 266
While Agent Orange recognized that corporations could be liable for a
violation of the law of nations, 267 the opinion provided far less clarity in
understanding which law governs the question. According to the court,
both international and domestic law bolstered its finding. 268 Yet the court
supported its position with few sources of international law. 269 Nowhere
did the court address whether a “specific, universal, and obligatory” norm
of international law extended liability to corporate entities.270 Furthermore,
within the context of domestic law, the court merely surmised that, as a

257. Id.
258. Id.; see Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *64–65 (characterizing this as a “stare decisisbased argument”). The court found the amicus brief submitted by Professor Jordan J. Paust
particularly “learned and compelling.” Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 18.
259. Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 58; see also Keitner, supra note 113, at 72.
260. Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 58.
261. Id. at 58–59.
262. See supra notes 209–12 and accompanying text.
263. Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (citing Talisman I, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 311–
19 (2003)).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.; see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
267. See Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 59.
268. Id.
269. See generally id. at 55–58 (expressly rejecting a handful of sources of international
law cited within the defendant’s brief as not granting corporations immunity).
270. See Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. CV 05-5133, 2010 WL 3969615, at *63 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 8, 2010) (identifying Agent Orange as failing to apply the Sosa standard).
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federal common law claim, the ATS binds corporations just as any
domestic tort would. 271
4. Judge Pierre N. Leval’s Concurrence in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.
The Second Circuit’s recent opinion in Kiobel offered a substantive
examination of which body of law should decide corporate ATS liability.272
Writing separately, Judge Pierre N. Leval reasoned that corporations could
be held liable for a violation of the law of nations.273 However, because the
complaint fell short of the pleading standards articulated by the Supreme
Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 274 Judge Leval concurred with the majority in
judgment. 275 Although written as a concurrence, this opinion functions
largely as a dissent due to the divergent choice of law principles that Judge
Leval applied. 276
Judge Leval utilized a complex two-tiered choice of law analysis in his
concurrence. 277 A court should first consider whether any set of facts in an
ATS case alleges a violation of the law of nations.278 A defendant can only
be held accountable for a violation if no principle of international law
exempts that type of defendant.279 If no such exemption exists, a court’s
second inquiry should focus on the appropriate remedies for a plaintiff
under international law. 280 Because international law allows States to
impose domestic remedies for civil violations, a judge should ask whether
domestic law allows a court to grant the plaintiff the requested remedy
against the defendant. 281
In accordance with this approach, Judge Leval began his analysis by
considering whether the set of facts alleged a violation of international
law. 282 If international law exempted corporations from liability, the court
According to the
could not hold the defendants accountable. 283
concurrence, corporations are not immune under international law.284
However, the Kiobel majority identified an exemption based in part on the
271. See supra notes 265–66 and accompanying text.
272. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). The
arguments presented by the majority in this case will be analyzed infra Part II.B.2.
273. See id. at 150 (Leval, J., concurring).
274. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); see supra note 160 and accompanying text (explaining how
the pleading standard has placed limitations on the ability of plaintiffs to sue corporate
entities).
275. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 153–54 (Leval, J., concurring).
276. See Anderson, supra note 15.
277. In Part III.A.2, this Note will further examine the method chosen by Judge Leval and
ultimately conclude that the approach can be simplified in accordance with the Supreme
Court’s holding in Sosa.
278. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 174.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 176.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 174, 188.
283. Id. at 174.
284. Id. at 175.
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lack of international tribunals exercising jurisdiction over corporations.285
According to Judge Leval, the absence of tribunals exercising jurisdiction in
no way implies that international law deems a corporation immune from
liability. 286 Rather, this is a reflection on the type of international
jurisdiction exercised over private actors.287 Notably, every tribunal to ever
exercise jurisdiction over private actors has acted within the context of
criminal liability. 288 However, it is widely believed by the international
community that imposing criminal punishment over a judicial person, like a
corporate entity, would be incompatible with the objectives of criminal
Thus, the absence of tribunals exerting jurisdiction over
law. 289
corporations results from the fact that these courts are only empowered to
exert criminal liability over private actors. 290 Judge Leval noted that, if this
lack of civil liability means that international law immunizes corporations,
natural persons would be immune from civil liability under the ATS as
well. 291
Although international law exerts jurisdiction solely over private actors
within the criminal context, it allows States to decide whether to inflict civil
penalties on these defendants.292 If a State decides to do so, the remedies
available are also left to that State’s discretion.293 This discretion exists in
light of the diversity of legal systems across the world and in recognition of
the near impossibility of reaching State consensus on how to impose civil
liability. 294 According to Judge Leval, a number of multilateral treaties
protecting human rights exemplify this principle.295 These treaties define
the general prohibited conduct, but allow each State to devise its own
system for enforcing the norm. 296 As such, a court’s second inquiry should

285. See id. The majority in Kiobel disputed Judge Leval’s characterization of its holding
as “immun[izing]” corporations from an ATS claim. Id. at 120 (majority opinion). The
majority maintained this characterization assumed that an international norm existed, rather
than correctly asking first whether international law extended liability to corporate
defendants. Id.
286. Id. at 166 (Leval, J., concurring).
287. See id. at 166–67.
288. Id. at 170–71 (citing Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., ¶ 4,
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute]; London Charter, supra note 240,
art. 1).
289. Id. at 166–68. The concurrence described the following objectives of criminal law:
retribution, incapacitation, specific deterrence, and general deterrence. See id. at 167.
However, the only punishment that can be inflicted on a corporation is a monetary fine. Id. at
168.
290. See id.; see also supra note 253 (describing Talisman I’s recognition of the
distinction between civil and criminal liability under international law).
291. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 176 (Leval, J., concurring).
292. Id. at 172–74.
293. Id. at 173.
294. Id.
295. Id. (discussing the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide arts. I, II, V, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277).
296. Id.; see also supra notes 184–89 and accompanying text (describing the U.N. Human
Rights Norms for Corporations, which encourages States to enforce human rights
domestically).
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focus on whether the domestic court has provided for such a remedy. 297 By
enacting the ATS, the U.S. Congress empowered courts to adjudicate
claims by foreign plaintiffs for violations of the law of nations and, thus,
sanctioned suits against corporate entities.298
Judge Leval rejected the contention that, under Sosa, imposition of
particular civil remedies must be universally accepted and applied by States
within their domestic courts. 299 Although Sosa required a “norm” to have
achieved universal acceptance, a norm refers to standards of conduct, not
the remedies States decide to implement. 300 This view is consistent with
Sosa, where the violation turned on whether the conduct of arbitrarily
detaining someone violated the law of nations.301 Additionally, opinions
considering the state action requirement support this contention.302 In TelOren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 303 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit considered whether conduct performed without color of State law
could be actionable.304 As a result, Sosa’s requirement that a norm enjoy
universal acceptance does not relate to the remedies that States decide to
impose domestically. 305
Next, Judge Leval concluded that the question of whether a corporation,
as opposed to an individual, can be liable relates to the remedy and not to
the corporation’s conduct. 306 The conduct of the corporate defendants in
Kiobel “indisputably does violate the law of nations.” 307 Judge Leval
distinguished this from Tel-Oren, where the defendant’s conduct, “because
297. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 175 (Leval, J., concurring).
298. See id.
299. Id. at 176–78.
300. See id. Much of this discussion mirrors the theories proposed by Professors William
R. Casto and Chimène I. Keitner, who argue that Sosa directs courts to distinguish between
conduct-regulating rules and other rules of decision under the ATS. See Casto, supra note
27, at 638–39 (“The new cause of action envisioned by Sosa is unintelligible unless the wellestablished distinction between rights and remedies is kept clearly in mind.”); William R.
Casto, Regulating the New Privateers of the Twenty-First Century, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 671,
695 (2006) (finding that the Sosa guidelines “draw a sharp distinction between the norms for
which a tort remedy is provided and the multitude of other legal issues that arise in tort
litigation”); Keitner, supra note 113, at 79–81 (distinguishing between “conduct-regulating
norms” and “ancillary” questions). Part III.B of this Note will further develop this theory
within the context of corporate liability and propose that courts utilize this approach in
understanding choice of law principles.
301. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 176–78 (Leval, J., concurring); see also supra notes 99–106 and
accompanying text (laying out Sosa’s examination of international sources to determine
whether the defendant’s conduct constituted a violation).
302. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 176–78 (discussing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)); see also Kadic v. Karadžić, 70
F.3d 232, 239–41 (2d Cir. 1995)).
303. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
304. Id.; see Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 177 (Leval, J., concurring).
305. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 178; see also Casto, supra note 300, at 695 (describing “rules of
decision that are not conduct-regulating norms” as not subject to the Sosa standard).
306. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 176–78. In addressing Judge Leval’s argument, the Kiobel
majority held that corporate liability should be considered akin to accessorial liability, rather
than a remedial issue. Id. at 147–48 (majority opinion). Remedies solely refer to what a
plaintiff may recover under the law. Id. at 147 n.50.
307. Id. at 177 (Leval, J., concurring).
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done by an actor of specified character, [did] not violate the law of
nations.” 308 Instead, the Kiobel defendants would be liable for their
conduct under the ATS even if an individual undertook that conduct. 309 In
other words, the question of whether a corporate defendant, as opposed to
an individual, can be held liable does not hinge on the conduct performed
by the defendant. Therefore, Sosa’s requirement of a “specific, universal,
and obligatory” norm should have no bearing on the issue at hand.310
Like the court in Agent Orange, Judge Leval contended that footnote
twenty of Sosa also supported his position.311 His concurrence rejected the
corporate defendant’s argument that footnote twenty distinguishes between
corporate and individual conduct. 312 Rather, read in context, the footnote
concerned the distinction between a private actor and state actor, not the
distinction between a corporate entity and an individual.313 By placing
corporate entities and individuals together, the court implied that natural
persons and judicial persons should be treated “identically” under the
ATS. 314
The patchwork of judicial opinions discussed above employs various
choice of law principles in concluding that corporations can be liable under
the ATS. The Eleventh Circuit rested its decision solely on precedent sub
silentio and the text of the statute.315 Although never explicitly addressing
which law governs, the Southern District of New York provided extensive
review of international authorities and precedent sub silentio in making its
determination. 316 The Eastern District of New York also examined
international sources in Agent Orange, but suggested that the fact that
domestic law imposes liability may suffice under the ATS.317 Finally, in
first looking to international law, Judge Leval’s Kiobel concurrence
concluded that this body of law allows States to apply their own domestic
remedies for conduct performed in violation of international law. 318
The concluding section of Part II analyzes the recent jurisprudence
denying that a corporate entity is capable of an ATS violation. While the
opinions addressed above employed widely divergent approaches in

308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See id.
311. Id. at 163–65; see also supra notes 258–59 and accompanying text (examining the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York’s reasoning in Agent Orange).
312. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 163–64.
313. Id. at 165 (“If the violated norm is one that international law applies only against
States, then ‘a private actor, such as a corporation or an individual,’ who acts
independently of a State, can have no liability . . . . [I]f the conduct is of the type classified
as a violation . . . regardless of whether done by a State or a private actor, then ‘a private
actor, such as a corporation or an individual,’ has violated the law of nations . . . .” (quoting
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004))); see also Keitner, supra note 113,
at 72.
314. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 165; see also Keitner, supra note 113, at 72.
315. See supra Part II.A.1.
316. See supra Part II.A.2.
317. See supra Part II.A.3.
318. See supra Part II.A.4.
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holding corporations liable, courts reaching the opposite result have
uniformly based their decisions on international law.
B. Courts Holding that Corporations Cannot Be Held Liable Under the
ATS Based on International Law
Prior to 2010, no court addressing the question of whether a corporation
could violate the law of nations had denied the existence of liability.319
However, within the span of a month, three courts—the Second Circuit,320
and the U.S. District Courts for the Central District of California321 and
Southern District of Indiana 322—had foreclosed plaintiffs from asserting an
ATS claim against any corporation within their jurisdictions.
1. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
Thirteen years following Unocal and the influx of corporate defendants
into ATS litigation,323 the Central District of California held that courts
have no jurisdiction over corporate entities. In Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 324 the
court dismissed corporate defendants Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., Nestle
USA, and Cargill, Inc. from a complaint alleging that the companies aided
and abetted the forced labor of Malians working on cocoa fields in Cote
d’Ivoire. 325 Although the court rested its holding on the plaintiffs’ failure
to plead sufficient facts under Iqbal, 326 the court chose to address the
corporate defendants’ argument that international law does not extend
liability to corporations. 327
The court first examined Sosa and the two opposing concerns that lower
courts grapple with when applying Sosa’s choice of law principles.328
Although the Supreme Court observed in Sosa that the First Congress did
not intend for the ATS to lay dormant, the Supreme Court also expressed
the need for restraint in recognizing causes of action under the ATS. 329 The
Central District of California found that Sosa’s discussion of law as “‘a
product of human choice’” weighs in favor of a restrained approach.330 The
court concluded that Sosa sought to cabin a judge’s discretion by requiring
that a court look to universally recognized and well-defined international
legal principles.331 In light of the language of footnote twenty,332 the
319. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 151.
320. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 111 (majority opinion).
321. Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. CV 05-5133, 2010 WL 3969615 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010).
322. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 744 F. Supp. 2d 810 (S.D. Ind. 2010); Viera
v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 1:09-cv-0495, 2010 WL 3893791 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2010).
323. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
324. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615.
325. Id. at *1.
326. Id. at *31.
327. Id. at *57.
328. Id. at *57–60.
329. Id. at *57–58; see supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text.
330. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *58 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,
729 (2004)); see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
331. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *58–59.
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Central District of California held that a court must utilize the same
restraint in assessing whether a particular type of defendant could be held
liable. 333 In other words, “the correct approach under Sosa is to determine
whether universal, well-defined international law ‘extends the scope of
liability for a violation of a given norm to . . . corporation[s].’”334
The court next examined the various lines of reasoning used by courts—
most notably in Agent Orange and Talisman I—that found in favor of
corporate liability. 335 First, the court rejected what it characterized as logicbased arguments. 336 These courts opined that there is no principled basis
for treating corporations differently than other defendants. 337 Yet Sosa
requires that judges not rely on their own opinion of what is fair or
logical. 338 According to the Central District of California, a court should
instead consider whether international law actually contains a specific and
universally recognized norm. 339
Nor did the court find that arguments based on judicial or historical
precedent illustrated a well-accepted norm of international law. 340 Despite
the abundance of case law recognizing corporate liability, none of these
opinions identified a sufficiently established norm, 341 and most did not
even mention corporate liability. 342 Furthermore, this would ignore the
fundamental principle that issues decided sub silentio should not be
afforded precedential value. 343 Turning to historical precedent, 344 the court
examined the following three sources: the Supreme Court’s early
recognition of the crime of piracy, 345 Blackstone’s commentary on

332. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20; see also supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text.
333. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *59.
334. Id. at *59 (alteration in original) (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20).
335. Id. at *62–71.
336. Id. at *62–64 (analyzing Romero, Talisman I, and Agent Orange, among others).
For discussion of the specific arguments utilized by these courts, see supra notes 213–14 and
accompanying text (Romero), supra notes 244, 247 and accompanying text (Talisman I), and
supra notes 254–57 and accompanying text (Agent Orange).
337. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *62.
338. Id. at *58. But see supra note 93 and accompanying text (explaining that principles
of fairness are evidence of the existing rules of international law).
339. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *64.
340. Id. at *65–66.
341. Id. (discussing Romero, Talisman I, and Agent Orange, among others). For
discussion of the specific arguments utilized by these courts, see supra notes 209–12 and
accompanying text (Romero), supra notes 234–38 and accompanying text (Talisman I), and
supra notes 260–62 and accompanying text (Agent Orange).
342. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *65–66.
343. Id. at *65; see Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925) (“Questions which merely
lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be
considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.”).
344. Although the court described these arguments as one of the lines of reasoning
utilized by other courts, the opinion failed to cite one instance in which a court considered
these specific sources. See Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *65–66.
345. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820) (discussing whether
piracy can be committed by a legal entity or solely by individuals).
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corporate crimes, 346 and a 1907 Attorney General’s opinion regarding the
use of the ATS. 347 Although the first two sources rejected the concept of
corporate liability, the Attorney General’s opinion provided some support
for the view that international law may potentially hold corporations
liable. 348
Previous courts addressing corporate liability under the ATS relied
extensively on international tribunals and conventions to hold corporate
defendants accountable. 349 Specifically, these courts cited heavily to
statements made by the Nuremberg Tribunals. 350 In Nestle, the court
characterized as “nothing more than dicta” any “stray references” made by
the tribunals regarding the possibility of corporate liability. 351 Next, the
court examined the treaties relied upon in Talisman I. 352 Although
Talisman I identified a handful of environmental treaties binding corporate
behavior, these treaties did not establish an accepted norm within the
context of human rights abuses. Furthermore, sources identifying a mere
indirect effect on or mere possibility of liability did not provide a universal
and well-defined consensus. 353 Again, the court emphasized that these
international sources did not rise to the high threshold required by Sosa.354
Following a rejection of the sources utilized by previous courts, the
Central District of California concluded that the minimum requirements of
Sosa had not been satisfied. 355 Therefore, the court held that corporations
are not subject to ATS liability, and the extent they should be is a matter
better left for Congress to decide. 356

346. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, *476 (“A corporation cannot commit treason, or
felony, or other crime, in its corporate capacity: though its members may, in their distinct
individual capacities.”).
347. See Charles J. Bonaparte, Mexican-Boundary-Diversion of the Rio Grande, 26 Op.
Att’y Gen. 250, 252–53 (1907) (recommending that a plaintiff use the ATS to remedy the
harm created by a corporation’s treaty violation).
348. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *66; cf. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621
F.3d 111, 162–63 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring) (arguing that the opinion by the
Attorney General refutes the view that international law does not recognize corporate
liability).
349. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *66–71.
350. Id. at *66–68 (examining the rationales of Agent Orange and Talisman I). For
discussion of the specific arguments utilized by these courts, see supra notes 240–42 and
accompanying text (Talisman I) and supra note 257 and accompanying text (Agent Orange).
351. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *68.
352. Id. at *68–71; see supra notes 239–45 and accompanying text (analyzing
Talisman I’s reliance on international treaties and conventions).
353. Nestle, 2010 WL 3969615, at *69–70.
354. Id. In rejecting these sources, the court identified the statute creating the
International Criminal Court as a compelling argument against treating corporate liability as
actionable under international law. Id. at *70–71 (discussing ICC Statute, supra note 288,
art. 25(1)). Specifically, the drafters of the statute were unable to reach a consensus on
whether corporations should be held responsible for human rights abuses. Id.
355. Id. at *74.
356. Id.
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2. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Less than ten days following Nestle, a second court issued a decision
holding that a corporation cannot violate the ATS. 357 In Kiobel, the Second
Circuit for the first time decided the question of whether the ATS extends to
actions against corporations. 358 Residents of Nigeria alleged that two
corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian government’s violent
suppression of an activist group opposed to their oil exploration
activities. 359 The Nigerians brought ATS claims in the Southern District of
New York for “aiding and abetting (1) extrajudicial killing; (2) crimes
against humanity; (3) torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment;
(4) arbitrary arrest and detention; (5) violation of the rights to life, liberty,
security, and association; (6) forced exile; and (7) property destruction.” 360
In September 2006, the district court dismissed a number of the claims
because they were not sufficiently defined by international law. 361 The
court allowed the remaining claims to move forward, but certified the entire
order for interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit.362
On appeal, the Second Circuit described the issue of whether the ATS
extends liability to judicial persons, such as corporate entities, as a question
“lurking in [its] ATS jurisprudence.” 363 Although the court had decided
ATS cases involving corporations previously, the Second Circuit did not
consider itself bound when a later case raised a jurisdictional issue that had
only been decided sub silentio.364 Therefore, the Second Circuit rejected
the argument that the cases, in any way, foreclosed consideration of this
“lurking” question. 365
As a preliminary matter, Judge José A. Cabranes, writing for the
majority, analyzed which body of law controlled the type of perpetrator
potentially liable under the ATS.366 First, the court noted that international
law is not silent on the subjects of international law nor does it leave this
question to individual States to determine. 367 This fact is particularly
357. Although the Kiobel court acknowledged the decision in Nestle, it did not examine
the Central District of California’s opinion. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621
F.3d 111, 117 n.10 (2d Cir. 2010). This is likely because the Second Circuit had, in large
part, drafted the lengthy Kiobel opinion prior to the issuance of Nestle. See id at 151 n.*
(Leval, J., concurring).
358. Id. at 117 (majority opinion). One judge in the circuit previously expressed the view
that corporations were not subject to ATS liability on the basis of customary international
law. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 321–26 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Since this dissenting opinion was
published, a number of corporations moved for dismissal based on this viewpoint. Kiobel,
621 F.3d at 161 (Leval, J., concurring).
359. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123 (majority opinion).
360. Id.
361. Id. at 124.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 117.
364. Id. at 124–25 (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1974)).
365. See id.
366. Id. at 125–31.
367. Id. at 126–27.
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evident from the Nuremberg Tribunals’ explicit recognition of individual
The Tribunals specifically rejected the argument that
liability. 368
international law was solely concerned with the actions of States and
declared that individuals could also be punished under international law.369
This discussion implied that international law had the ability to recognize
corporate liability, as it had previously done with individual liability. 370
Next, the court examined Sosa and precedent interpreting and applying
the Supreme Court’s Sosa reasoning. 371 According to the court, footnote
twenty and Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Sosa left no question that a
court must look to international law to determine whether jurisdiction exists
over a particular ATS defendant. 372 This interpretation of Sosa is
consistent with three decades of Second Circuit precedent.373 It had been
the practice of the court, starting with Filártiga, to look to international law
to determine whether a state official committed a violation.374
Additionally, in Kadic, the court looked to international law to determine
whether a private actor could be liable.375 Following Sosa, the court
considered footnote twenty as requiring it to resort to international law to
determine whether aiders and abettors could violate the law of nations.376
The court found “no principled basis for treating the question of corporate
liability differently.” 377 As a result, the Second Circuit concluded that
international law, Sosa, and circuit precedent required application of
customary international law. 378
The court next turned to whether the sources of international law
demonstrate that corporate liability had obtained the status of a “specific,
universal, and obligatory” norm in international law.379 In reviewing the
decisions of international tribunals, the court concluded that no tribunal had
ever held a corporation liable for violation of customary international

368. Id.
369. Id.
370. See id.
371. Id. at 127–31.
372. See id. at 127–28; see supra notes 125–30 and accompanying text.
373. Id. at 131.
374. Id. at 128.
375. Id. (citing Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239–41 (2d Cir. 1995)).
376. Id. at 128–29 (citing Talisman II, 582 F.3d 244, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2009)). The court
also discussed Judge Robert Allen Katzmann’s separate opinion in Khulumani v. Barclay
National Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 282 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring), as
requiring the court to consider international law under the ATS because, “‘[u]nder the [ATS]
the relevant norm is provided not by domestic statute but by the law of nations, and that law
extends responsibility for the violations of its norms to aiders and abettors.’” Kiobel, 621
F.3d at 130 (alternation in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 282
(Katzmann, J., concurring)). However, in Judge Katzmann’s dissent from the denial of
rehearing en banc, he described his position in Khulumani as consistent with Judge Leval’s
determination that corporations can be held accountable under the ATS. See Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2011 WL 338151, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 4,
2011) (en banc) (Katzmann, J., dissenting).
377. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 130.
378. Id. at 130–31.
379. Id. at 131–45.
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law. 380 Specifically, the Nuremberg Tribunals purposely declined to hold
the corporations involved liable. Rather, the Tribunals “expressly defined
liability under the law of nations as liability that could not be divorced from
Additionally, the court found
individual moral responsibility.” 381
significant that the drafters of the charters establishing both the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia382 and the International
Criminal Court 383 expressly rejected proposals to include judicial persons
within the jurisdiction of the courts.384
The Second Circuit’s examination of treaty-based obligations also failed
to demonstrate a well-established norm of customary international law in
favor of corporate liability. 385 The court rejected Talisman I’s reliance on
treaties not ratified by the United States, many of which had not been
ratified by the States most affected by the terms of the treaty. 386 Because
only universally recognized treaties may be treated as evidence of
customary international law, 387 the court found these treaties insufficient to
demonstrate a norm of corporate liability. 388 Additionally, the few treaties
that were ratified and universally recognized by States had little influence
within the context of human rights law.389 These treaties could not be said
to crystallize an emerging general rule of customary international law
beyond their limited subject matters. 390 Lastly, the court rejected these
treaties as lacking a “fundamentally norm creating character” and thus
failing to demonstrate a norm of customary international law. 391
The court identified the submissions of two publicists, Professor James
Crawford and then-Professor Christopher Greenwood, as further supporting
its holding. 392 Although many scholars favor imposing liability on
corporations under the ATS, even these individuals acknowledge that no

380. Id. at 132. In Judge Leval’s concurrence, he contended that the majority’s argument
depended on the practice of international criminal tribunals. Id. at 166–70 (Leval, J.,
concurring). For a discussion on the effect that this difference between criminal and civil
law has on corporate liability under international law, see supra notes 288–91 and
accompanying text.
381. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 135 (majority opinion).
382. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
383. ICC Statute, supra note 288, art. 25(1).
384. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 136–37.
385. Id. at 137–41.
386. Id. at 138.
387. See supra text accompanying notes 90–92 (discussing the relevance of treaties as
customary international law).
388. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 138–41.
389. Id. at 139. The court characterized these agreements as “specialized treaties.” Id.
390. Id. Even if these treaties could be viewed as crystallizing an international norm, the
court argued that the express rejection of corporate liability within the context of human
rights treaties would make doing so inappropriate. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 142–44. Principles of international law allow courts to consider the works of
publicists, such as professors and jurists, to be evidence of customary international law. See
supra note 94 and accompanying text. In Talisman I, the court considered affidavits
submitted by these two publicists and ultimately rejected their conclusions. See supra notes
227–28 and accompanying text.
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international body has yet imposed criminal liability on a corporate
entity. 393
From this extensive review of international tribunals, international
treaties, and works of publicists, the Second Circuit concluded that the
concept of corporate liability had not yet ripened into a rule of customary
international law.394 Subject matter jurisdiction over claims against
corporations can only be attained by universal acceptance of corporate
liability within the international community, which for the time being, has
yet to be established. 395 However, the court emphasized that its opinion in
no way foreclosed suits against individual corporate officers, actions
against corporations under other bodies of law, or the ability of Congress to
take action. 396
Following the Kiobel decision, the plaintiffs petitioned the panel for
rehearing. 397 On February 4, 2011, the panel denied plaintiffs’ request for
rehearing in a 2–1 vote. 398 Judge Dennis G. Jacobs filed a concurring
opinion that described the various policy considerations supporting the
majority’s decision. 399 First, Judge Jacobs argued that Judge Leval’s
opinion failed to acknowledge that other nations have an interest in the
remedies afforded under U.S. law. 400 For example, while it is universally
accepted that piracy is in violation of international law, a country still may
not extradite that individual in light of that country’s opposition to capital
punishment in the United States.401 Second, Judge Jacobs described the
majority’s holding as promoting international comity. 402 Cases brought
against foreign companies cause international rivalries and grievances.403
According to Judge Jacobs, this outcome contradicts the universal
consensus at the foundation of customary international law. 404 Third,
Kiobel will have the practical benefit of preventing plaintiffs from using the
ATS “to extort settlements” from corporations. 405 For these reasons, Judge

393. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 142–44. In Judge Leval’s concurrence, he explained that these
affidavits were prepared in response to a request for further briefing on what countries or
international tribunals have held corporations liable for a violation of the law of nations. Id.
at 182 (Leval, J., concurring). However, the absence of such judgments does not bar a
domestic court from imposing liability. See supra notes 292–98 and accompanying text.
394. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149 (majority opinion).
395. Id.
396. Id. at 122.
397. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2011 WL
338048, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2011).
398. Id.
399. Id. (Jacobs, J., concurring in the denial of panel rehearing); see also Second Circuit
Denies Rehearing in Kiobel: Confirms that the Circuit Does Not Recognize Corporate
Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, MILBANK LITIGATION 2 (2011),
http://www.milbank.com/NR/rdonlyres/9ED14DF9-61E3-4ECD-A18C-27C26790ADE0/0/
021011Kiobel_En_Banc_Litigation_Client_Alert.pdf.
400. Kiobel, 2011 WL 338048, at *1.
401. Id.
402. Id. at *2–3.
403. Id. at *2.
404. Id.
405. Id. at *3–4.

2011]

“MORAL MONSTERS” UNDER THE BED

2899

Jacobs found the Kiobel opinion to be a “matter of great importance” and
rightly decided. 406
Following Kiobel, an active judge and a senior judge of the Second
Circuit also requested a poll on whether to rehear the case en banc.407 On
the same day that the panel denied rehearing, the active judges of the
Second Circuit divided 5–5 as to whether to proceed with an en banc
rehearing. 408 Because no majority favored en banc review, the request for
rehearing was denied. 409
3. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
Thirteen days following the decision in Kiobel, the Southern District of
Indiana, in Viera v. Eli Lilly & Co., 410 fully adopted the Second Circuit’s
reasoning. 411 Brazilian residents filed an ATS claim against six U.S.
corporations for injuries suffered from pollution emanating from a number
of manufacturing facilities located in two Brazilian cities.412 Although the
court opined in dicta that the allegations of environmental pollution did not
constitute an actionable ATS violation,413 the court primarily rested its
holding on the Second Circuit’s assertion that “the ATS cannot provide
federal court jurisdiction over claims based on voluntary actions taken by a
corporation.” 414
Within a week of Viera, a second judge within the Southern District of
Indiana dismissed an ATS case based on the Kiobel reasoning. In Flomo v.
Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 415 a group of Liberian children filed a
complaint against Firestone Natural Rubber Co. for its Liberian subsidiary’s
use of forced child labor. 416 While the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment was under review, the Second Circuit handed down Kiobel.417
After requesting supplemental briefing, Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson
concluded that the court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the

406. Id. at *4. Judge Leval dissented from the denial of rehearing and described Judge
Jacobs’s opinion as “reveal[ing] an intense, multi-faceted policy agenda that underlies the
majority’s undertaking to exempt corporations from the law of nations.” Id. at *4 (Leval, J.,
dissenting). While Judge Leval did not find all of the policy considerations to be frivolous,
he did not believe it was the role of the courts to make foreign and domestic policy. Id.
Additionally, he viewed most of Judge Jacobs’s grievances as directed at ATS jurisdiction
generally and having no bearing on the specific issue of corporate liability. Id.
407. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2011 WL
338151, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2011) (en banc).
408. See id. (Katzmann, J., dissenting).
409. Id.
410. No. 1:09-cv-0495, 2010 WL 3893791 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2010).
411. See id. at *2 (finding the “reasoning of the Second Circuit persuasive”).
412. Id. at *1.
413. Id. at *2–3.
414. See id. at *2.
415. 744 F. Supp. 2d 810 (S.D. Ind. 2010).
416. Id. at 812.
417. Id.
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plaintiffs’ claims. 418 However, the court granted summary judgment for the
defendants in light of the Kiobel reasoning. 419
The court first considered plaintiffs’ contention that federal law
automatically controlled the scope of a corporation’s liability under the
ATS. 420 After examining footnote twenty, the court held that such an
argument is against the plain language of Sosa. 421
Next, the court asked whether international law directed domestic courts
to apply federal common law. 422 The court found persuasive the majority’s
reasoning in Kiobel that corporate liability was not proper “until
international law . . . affirmatively approves the doctrine.”423 Judge
Magnus-Stinson found three arguments put forth by the Kiobel majority
particularly compelling. First, there existed a lack of consensus regarding
the applicability of corporate liability under international law.424 To
discount such fact would run counter to internationally accepted norms by
allowing a court to punish a company, rather than merely compensate an
injured party. 425 Second, Congress expressly limited complaints under the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) 426 to those against
individuals. 427 The TVPA was intended to codify the classic ATS claim of
torture performed by a State. 428 Because of this, the court determined that
the decision to limit the scope of this statute provided the court with
congressional guidance on the question of corporate liability. 429 Third,
there exists no availability of civil corporate liability for violations of the
law of nations outside of the ATS or for American citizens.430 In light of
this, the court held that recognizing corporate liability would increase forum
shopping and result in disparate treatment of citizens and foreign
plaintiffs. 431
Therefore, the Southern District of Indiana held that no norm of
customary international law held corporations accountable.432 Because

418. Id. at 812–13. Specifically, the court noted that because the question of corporate
liability was not definitely resolved, the court could not find the claims to be frivolous so as
to deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 813.
419. See id. at 814–16.
420. See id. at 815–16.
421. Id.
422. See id. at 816–18.
423. Id. at 816.
424. Id. at 816–17; see supra notes 371–93 and accompanying text.
425. Flomo, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 817. For a discussion of the appropriate objectives of
international criminal law, see supra notes 287–90 and accompanying text.
426. Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
note (2006)).
427. Flomo, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 817. While Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson found this
argument particularly compelling, the Kiobel majority only mentioned it briefly in a
footnote. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 122 n.23 (2d Cir. 2010).
428. Flomo, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 817.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 818.
431. Id.
432. Id.
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plaintiffs failed to establish a legally cognizable claim, the court entered
summary judgment for the defendant. 433
The Northern District of California, Second Circuit, and Southern
District of Indiana uniformly applied international law to analyze whether a
corporation can be liable for an ATS violation. Ultimately, these courts
concluded that no norm of international law held corporations accountable
and thus jurisdiction could not be exerted over the category of
defendants. 434
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING CHOICE OF LAW PRINCIPLES
AFTER KIOBEL
The conflicting outcomes analyzed in Part II resulted almost entirely
from the courts’ initial decisions to apply either domestic or international
law. However, the uncertainty regarding which body of law governs is not
limited to the context of corporate liability, but is part of a more
encompassing inconsistency across circuits when confronting any novel
ATS issue. 435 For example, prior to Kiobel, the muddled state of aiding and
abetting liability caused frustration among scholars and persistent
uncertainty for litigants.436 A framework to guide choice of law decisions
would not only add clarity to the question of corporate liability, but would
also relieve the enduring confusion with ATS choice of law principles.
The next part of this Note advocates for the fashioning of a new
framework that provides a broad rule to guide all choice of law decisions
made within the scope of the ATS. Part III.A addresses the delinquencies
inherent in the alternative approaches taken by courts in both allowing and
denying corporate ATS liability in an effort to discern the appropriate
choice of law principles. Part III.B expounds upon the works of Professors
William R. Casto and Chimène I. Keitner to argue that international law
solely controls the inquiry of what constitutes a violation of the law of
nations. All other issues, including whether corporate entities can be liable
under the ATS, are to be governed by U.S. federal common law.
A. The Significant Shortcomings of the Current Approaches
Despite a number of opportunities to add clarity to this issue, the
overwhelming number of courts decline to address the question.437 At first
blush, these opinions appear to imply that corporate liability is undoubtedly

433. Id.
434. See supra notes 355–56 and accompanying text (Nestle); supra notes 394–96 and
accompanying text (Kiobel); supra notes 410–14 and accompanying text (Viera); supra
notes 432–33 and accompanying text (Flomo).
435. See, e.g., supra note 113 and accompanying text (confusion regarding how far a
norm extends); supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text (varied application of laws to
define the elements of aiding and abetting liability); supra note 117 and accompanying text
(questions regarding which international sources should be considered).
436. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
437. See supra notes 194–99 and accompanying text.
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appropriate. 438 However, even disregarding their debatable precedential
weight, 439 these courts make no attempt to identify the correct choice of law
principles. Therefore, this Note will not consider precedent sub silentio
informative on the question of what body of law should govern whether
corporations can be held liable. Although deeply flawed, the handful of
opinions that do directly address the issue provide some insight. This
section assesses what value, if any, the opinions examined in Part II of this
Note have added to the issue.
1. The Failure To Understand “Norms” as “Standards of Conduct”
Turning first to cases denying the liability of corporate defendants, these
opinions all suffer from one critical flaw. The Second Circuit and Central
District of California assumed that the standard for defining what
constitutes a violation of a “specific, universal, and obligatory norm” must
somehow also control the definition for who can commit a violation.440
Judge Leval’s Kiobel concurrence highlighted the confusion underlying the
approach taken by the Kiobel majority and other courts: the Supreme Court
intended the Sosa standard solely to govern the question of whether a
defendant’s conduct violated international law.441 Sosa’s interpretation of
the ATS, and subsequent courts’ reliance on Sosa, demonstrate that a
“norm” solely relates to a defendant’s conduct.442
A “norm” relates to standards of conduct when viewed in the context of
the original understanding of the ATS.443 According to the Supreme Court
in Sosa, it is generally understood that the First Congress enacted the ATS
with a narrow set of offenses in mind—cases “threatening serious
consequences in international affairs” and still demanding an individual
Specifically, Sosa identified infringements of
judicial remedy. 444
ambassadorial rights, piracy claims, and violations of safe conduct as
falling within this limited category. 445 These examples hinged on the
international character implicated by the conduct.446 Therefore, when
438. For use of precedent sub silentio as an argument in favor of recognizing corporate
liability, see supra notes 209–12 and accompanying text (Romero), supra notes 234–38 and
accompanying text (Talisman I), and supra notes 260–62 and accompanying text (Agent
Orange).
439. For an understanding of why these opinions should not be regarded as binding
precedent, see supra notes 341–43 and accompanying text (Nestle) and supra notes 363–65
and accompanying text (Kiobel).
440. See supra notes 328–34 and accompanying text (Nestle); 366–78 and accompanying
text (Kiobel).
441. See supra notes 299–305 and accompanying text.
442. See supra notes 299–305 and accompanying text.
443. See supra notes 299–300 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 49–56 and
accompanying text (describing Sosa’s examination of the motives behind the First
Congress’s enactment of the ATS).
444. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004); see also supra notes 50–52 and
accompanying text.
445. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
446. See supra notes 299–301 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 53–57 and
accompanying text.
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comparing any claim based on the present-day law of nations to these
offenses, Sosa merely required that the conduct be defined with the same
level of specificity and universal acceptance as the conduct troubling the
First Congress. 447
Sosa’s application of the standard to Alvarez-Machain’s claim of a
modern day violation further illustrates the Court’s focus on a norm as
conduct. 448 The Court exclusively questioned whether Sosa’s conduct—
arbitrarily detaining Alvarez-Machain—violated a universally recognized
norm. 449 In finding for Sosa, the Court again described the issue solely in
terms of conduct: Alvarez-Machain failed to demonstrate that “a single
illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to
lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment” violated customary
international law. 450 The Court never indicated that the same standard
should govern who could be liable for such conduct. 451
Cases applying this standard fully support the conclusion that Sosa
defined a “norm” as a standard of conduct.452 In cases brought against
private individuals, courts often question whether a norm of international
law can hold private actors liable for the specific conduct at issue.453 In
Kadic, the Second Circuit undoubtedly considered the identity of the
perpetrator as a public or private actor. 454 However, the court solely
distinguished between the two categories of actors to determine whether the
conduct at issue was of “universal concern.” 455 This is exactly the
distinction the Supreme Court recognized as potentially significant in
footnote twenty. 456 While footnote twenty asked whether international law
extended to the perpetrator being sued, the Supreme Court was concerned
with whether the conduct of a private actor could violate the law of
nations. 457 In other words, certain conduct performed under “color of state
law” is more likely to meet the Sosa standard than conduct performed by a
private actor. 458 Once the Second Circuit in Kadic determined that the
private actor’s conduct violated a well-established and universally
recognized norm, the defendant’s identity as a private individual had little
bearing on his liability. 459
447. See supra notes 299–300 and accompanying text; see also supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
448. See supra note 301 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 100–06 and
accompanying text.
449. See supra notes 100–06 and accompanying text.
450. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004).
451. See supra note 301 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 100–06 and
accompanying text (discussing Sosa’s examination of sources of international law).
452. See supra notes 302–05 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 143–50 and accompanying text (discussing Unocal and Kadic’s
holding on the state action requirement).
454. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text.
455. See supra notes 144–47, 150 and accompanying text.
456. See supra notes 258–59, 311–14 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 125–
30 and accompanying text (describing footnote twenty in Sosa).
457. See supra notes 311–14 and accompanying text.
458. See supra notes 302–05 and accompanying text.
459. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, although still an open question, courts often apply the Sosa
standard to determine the elements of aiding and abetting liability. 460 In
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. (Talisman II),461
the Second Circuit looked to international law to find a well-established and
universally recognized standard for accessorial liability. 462 Again, this
discussion focused solely on the conduct of the defendant—whether
Talisman purposefully assisted in the ethnic cleansing of the Sudanese
population—and not on any separate attribute possessed by the
defendant. 463
Sosa solely required that standards of conduct be well-established and
universally recognized within international law to form the basis of an ATS
claim. 464 In employing this approach to determine whether a corporate
entity can be liable under the ATS, the Second Circuit, Central District of
California, and Southern District of Indiana failed to make this critical
distinction. 465
2. The Misapplication of International Law to “Remedial Questions”
Courts holding that corporate entities are proper ATS defendants
correctly decline to apply the Sosa standard to the issue of who can be
liable under the ATS. 466 However, these opinions are also not without their
shortcomings. Judge Leval’s Kiobel concurrence began by questioning
whether “any set of facts” violates international law.467 Yet, this opinion
offered no clear justification for doing so. Although Judge Leval
recognized that federal common law provides the source of law for
remedial questions, he based this finding strictly on principles stemming
from international law.468 Specifically, Judge Leval opined that there exists
a principle of international law that allows States to fashion their own
domestic remedies for civil liability. 469 Only because of this principle did
Judge Leval find it appropriate to turn back to federal common law for a
remedy against corporate defendants.470 Although Judge Leval’s Kiobel
concurrence ultimately applied the correct body of law—federal common
law—his opinion failed to recognize that Sosa allows courts to apply
domestic law directly to remedial questions.
460. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
461. 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
462. Id. at 258–59.
463. See generally id.
464. See supra notes 443–47 and accompanying text.
465. See supra notes 328–34 and accompanying text (Nestle); supra notes 366–79 and
accompanying text (Kiobel); supra notes 410–14 and accompanying text (Viera); supra
notes 420–21 and accompanying text (Flomo).
466. See supra notes 208–15 and accompanying text (Romero); supra notes 268–70 and
accompanying text (Agent Orange); supra notes 299–305 and accompanying text (Kiobel
(Leval, J., concurring)).
467. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 174 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J.,
concurring); see supra note 278 and accompanying text.
468. See supra notes 292–96 and accompanying text.
469. See supra notes 292–97 and accompanying text.
470. See supra notes 293–98 and accompanying text.
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In Sosa, the Supreme Court made clear that federal common law still
plays a significant role in adjudication of ATS cases. While the Court
denied that the ATS created a new cause of action, it recognized that the
ATS granted jurisdiction to a limited number of claims by foreign
plaintiffs. 471 As discussed above, a judge must consider international law
to determine whether a defendant has violated a particular standard of
conduct and, thus, is entitled to jurisdiction.472 A defendant’s conduct must
“violate [a] norm of customary international law so well defined as to
support the creation of a federal remedy.” 473 In other words, once this
threshold has been met, federal common law provides the remedy. 474
While “remedies” are often viewed as the type of recovery available to a
plaintiff, 475 used within the context of the ATS, the term “remedies”
encompasses a far broader meaning. As described by the Court in Sosa, the
“remedies” flowing from domestic law refer to the creation of the cause of
action. 476 Here, Professor Casto’s comparison to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions
provides a useful illustration. 477 Like the ATS, § 1983 authorizes creation
of a remedy for violations of standards of conduct. The U.S. Constitution
provides these standards for § 1983 actions. 478 The rights in the
Constitution, like the norms stemming from international law, provide the
means of identifying an actionable violation.479 However, once these
violations are identified, a court has the discretion to adjudicate both types
of claims under federal common law. 480 While this comparison is
undoubtedly imperfect, it serves as a useful means for understanding the
interaction between international law, which governs the norms violated by
a defendant, and domestic law, which provides plaintiffs with a remedy for
such a violation.
Part III.A identified two significant flaws in the reasoning of courts
considering the issue of corporate liability. First, courts denying the
liability of corporations mechanically apply the Sosa standard without any
justification for doing so. Second, courts holding corporations accountable
fail to recognize that Sosa allows courts to apply federal common law to
remedial questions regardless of the contours of international law. From
these principles, the remaining section constructs a workable framework for
courts to utilize when choosing the correct law in future ATS cases.

471. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
472. See supra Part III.A.1.
473. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004).
474. See Casto, supra note 27, at 638–44; Casto, supra note 300, at 694; Keitner, supra
note 113, at 81; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text.
475. See supra note 306 (discussing the Second Circuit’s argument that remedies only
relate to what a plaintiff may recover).
476. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
477. See Casto, supra note 27, at 639–40.
478. Id. at 640.
479. Id. Specifically, § 1983 authorizes a federal court to entertain claims by a plaintiff
who alleges that a state official deprived him or her of “any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
480. Casto, supra note 27, at 640.
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B. A Framework Based on the Distinction Between “Standards of
Conduct” and “Remedies”
The escalating conflict among courts over whether corporate entities may
be held liable under the ATS stems largely from a failure to fully
comprehend the relationship between standards of conduct and remedies.481
Professors Casto and Keitner describe a coherent way for courts to
distinguish between these two issues. 482 For the most part, this approach
has only been advocated within the context of aiding and abetting
liability. 483 However, in light of Kiobel, this framework provides a
valuable approach for future courts faced with the question of whether they
may impose ATS liability on a corporation. Additionally, if adopted by
courts, this framework would not only help resolve the persistent questions
surrounding the ATS but also act as a guide for the range of issues likely to
arise in future ATS cases.
According to these scholars, there exist two categories of issues arising
under the ATS. First, a court may be presented with the question of
whether the defendant violated a “‘conduct-regulating norm[].’” 484 This
category of issues demands substantive inquiry into the nature of a
defendant’s behavior. Like the issues examined in Part I.B of this Note,
“conduct-regulating norms” involve determining what constitutes a
violation of the law of nations. In accordance with Sosa, these norms must
be examined by resorting to principles of international law.485 Specifically,
when considering a “conduct-regulating norm” a judge must ask whether
the defendant’s conduct violated a “specific, universal, and obligatory”
international norm. 486
Because federal common law provides the source of the remedy in ATS
litigation, there exists a second category of issues characterized as
“ancillary” questions. 487 These tort remedies are a matter of “pure
While these questions have previously been
domestic law.” 488

481. See supra Part III.A.
482. See generally Casto, supra note 27; Casto, supra note 300; Keitner, supra note 113.
483. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 284–86 (2d Cir.
2007) (Hall, J., concurring) (arguing that accessorial liability is not a rule of primary liability
and consulting federal common law); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 963 (9th Cir.
2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (characterizing aiding and abetting liability as an ancillary
question and applying domestic law), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 403 F.3d 708 (9th
Cir. 2005); Keitner, supra note 113, at 74–83 (arguing that aiding and abetting liability is a
question of conduct and applying international law); Charles Ainscough, Note, Choice of
Law and Accomplice Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 588,
596 (2010) (contending that accomplice liability regulates conduct and arguing for
application of international law).
484. Keitner, supra note 113, at 80–81 (quoting Casto, supra note 300, at 695).
485. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
486. See supra Part III.A.1.
487. See Keitner, supra note 113, at 80–81; see also Casto, supra note 27, at 639; Casto,
supra note 300, at 695.
488. See Casto, supra note 27, at 644.
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characterized as matters of practice and procedure,489 they more broadly
include all other issues which, whether substantive or not, do not bear on
the defendant’s conduct.490 It is from this understanding that these scholars
argue that any issue arising under the ATS can be addressed.
Under this framework, the question of who can be liable for violating the
ATS hinges on whether a perpetrator’s identity in any way relates to that
perpetrator’s conduct. If not, this likely should be classified as an
“ancillary” issue and be governed by domestic law.491 However, if the
identity of a corporation, as a judicial entity or otherwise, sheds light on the
illegality of that corporation’s conduct, it may be relevant to a “conductregulating norm.” 492 As demonstrated in Kadic and Talisman II, a
defendant’s identity as a private actor or aider and abettor may factor into
the consideration of whether a corporation’s conduct violated international
law. 493 In these circumstances, it is proper for the court to consider the
Sosa standard as guiding its focus. 494
Yet the identity of a corporation as a “judicial entity” in no way affects a
court’s analysis of the corporation’s conduct.495 The courts that denied the
liability of corporations failed to contend that the conduct performed by the
corporate defendants did not violate a “specific, universal, and obligatory”
norm of international law. 496 The conduct by the defendants in Kiobel
undoubtedly violated the law of nations. 497 Had this conduct been
performed by a private actor, there would be little reason not to hold that
actor accountable.498 The court, however, refused to hold the defendant
liable for its conduct solely on account of its existence as a corporate
entity. 499 As a result, there existed no principled reason for treating the
question of corporate liability as anything other than a remedial issue
governed by the long-established practice of treating corporations as any
other person under federal common law.
Courts holding corporations accountable have in some way articulated
this argument. In Romero, Talisman I, and Agent Orange, the courts
continually emphasized that no reason existed for treating corporations
differently than any other private actor.500 However, these courts failed to
link the principle to a larger understanding of the difference between
489. See Keitner, supra note 113, at 81 & n.93 (citing Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d
932, 964 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 403
F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005)).
490. See Casto, supra note 27, at 642–43; see also supra Part III.A.2.
491. See supra notes 487–90 and accompanying text.
492. See supra notes 484–86 and accompanying text.
493. See supra notes 452–63 and accompanying text.
494. See supra notes 452–59 and accompanying text.
495. See supra notes 306–10 and accompanying text.
496. See supra Part II.B.
497. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
498. See supra notes 306–10 and accompanying text.
499. See supra notes 306–10 and accompanying text.
500. See supra notes 213–14 and accompanying text (Romero); supra notes 244, 247 and
accompanying text (Talisman I); supra notes 254–57 and accompanying text (Agent
Orange).
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conduct and remedies under the ATS. By failing to do so, they opened their
position up to criticism from opposing jurists as merely based on principles
of fairness and not rooted in any substantive ATS principle. 501 Yet as this
Note demonstrates, the ATS and Supreme Court jurisprudence mandate that
when the conduct of a corporation violates international law, a plaintiff is
entitled to a cause of action based on principles of federal common law. 502
With the issue of corporate liability at the forefront of the debate following
Kiobel, courts must act quickly to articulate a clearer set of choice of law
principles based on the distinction between standards of conduct and
remedial issues, or risk having the Second Circuit’s reasoning further
adopted across circuits.
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel shattered the already fractured
landscape of ATS jurisprudence existing within the United States. 503
Although Sosa in many ways achieved its goal by articulating a standard for
what constitutes a violation, 504 the opinion offered inherently inconsistent
advice as to who can be held liable.505 With the recent flurry of suits
against corporate entities,506 courts finding in favor of liability have
struggled to articulate a coherent rationale behind their holdings. 507 This
Note identified the contrary holdings courts have reached based in part on
the varying choice of law principles applied.508 In the wake of Kiobel,
courts must provide a fundamental reassessment of their overall approach to
determining which body of law applies to questions arising under the ATS.
A framework based on the distinction between standards of conduct, which
are governed by international law, and remedies, which are controlled by
domestic law, offers judges a valuable starting point in their analysis.509

501. See supra notes 335–39 and accompanying text (discussing Nestle’s holding that
arguments based on principles of fairness have no bearing on what norms of international
law actually exist).
502. See supra Part III.A.2.
503. See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text (describing the confusion among
courts in applying the Sosa standard prior to the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel).
504. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
505. See supra Part I.C.1.
506. See supra Part I.C.2.
507. See supra Part II.B.
508. See supra Part II.
509. See supra Part III.B.

